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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Background 
This dissertation is comprised of two essays on public-to-private reverse leveraged 
buyouts (RLBO). The first essay uses firm fundamentals to examine profitability, financial 
structure, operations, and cost structure from before the leveraged buyout (LBO) to after the 
RLBO to uncover restructuring activities during the private period. I then determine which of 
those private period actions lead to post-RLBO success.  
The second essay investigates the long-run stock performance of public-to-private 
RLBOs after exiting the private period. In this essay, I study whether empirical regularities 
documented for initial public offerings (IPO) are also found to occur in RLBOs. I also analyze 
whether private period restructuring leads to superior stock returns after the offering. Finally, I 
determine which elements of corporate governance determine post-RLBO stock performance. 
Public-to-private reversed leveraged buyouts occur when exchange listed firms are taken 
private financed primarily through long-term debt, and then subsequently go public again. As the 
firm was publicly traded in the past, they most closely resemble a second IPO. A division-to-
private RLBO happens when a component of a large publicly traded firm is acquired by a private 
equity group, and is then offered to the public. These transactions can best be described as a 
highly levered equity carve-out. When a private equity firm directly acquires an unlisted firm 
and then later conducts public offering, it is considered to be a private-to-private RLBO. As the 
firm was not publicly traded before, these RLBOs are effectively first IPOs with large amounts 
of long-term debt.  
Prior research on RLBOs uses samples which are primarily private-to-private and 
division-to-private transactions, and therefore focuses on the years after the RLBO. As a result, 
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the literature has been unable to shed light on restructuring during the private period. The first 
essay, titled “Reverse Leveraged Buyouts: What Happens during the Private Period?” studies 
these restructuring activities undertaken during the private period. 
Using a large sample of exclusively public-to-private RLBOs, I compare firm 
fundamentals from before to after the private period. These results are enhanced by private 
period data available for a subset of firms, to better understand corporate decisions taken while 
restructuring. Employing this research design, this study is the first to document restructuring 
activities during the private period, and their relation to subsequent financial performance. I then 
investigate how private period activities influence post-RLBO valuations. 
Private period duration and whether it is related to post-RLBO success generates 
considerable discussion in the business media. This essay investigates whether a basis for these 
concerns exists, and whether conditions at the LBO are related to the time in restructuring. At the 
same time, prior studies document that RLBOs have a high attrition rate after the offering, while 
offering few explanations for why these firms are vulnerable in the market for corporate control. 
I close this gap in the literature by identifying those actions that lead to post-RLBO long-run 
independence. 
If private period restructuring influences post-RLBO valuation, is this due to changes in 
management behavior? Theory suggests that excess free cash flow combined with insufficient 
growth opportunities leads to overinvestment. Long-term debt is the mechanism proposed to 
ameliorate these costs, which suggests that RLBOs should be less susceptible than their peers to 
negative net present value investments. To test this, I investigate whether restructuring impacts 
the relationship between capital expenditures and free cash flow over time and within classes of 
firms.  
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The second essay is titled “Determinants of Long-run Stock Price Performance Following 
Reverse Leveraged Buyouts” This study investigates the long-run stock performance of public-
to-private RLBOs. Prior research documents that initial public offerings (IPOs) suffer from long-
run underperformance. As public-to-private RLBOs are a second IPO, examining the stock 
returns of these unique transactions provides an opportunity to explore the role of asymmetric 
information in long-run performance.  
If equity values represent market expectations for long-run cash flows, then stock returns 
are the realization of these projections. If markets are efficient, then the determinants found to be 
relevant to post-RLBO equity values in the first essay should be similarly correlated to long-run 
stock performance. To investigate this, I test the relationship between firm fundamentals during 
the private period and at the RLBO with long-run stock returns after the RLBO.  
I next examine whether corporate governance after the RLBO impacts long-run stock 
returns, by investigating the executive committee of the board of directors. Finally, I study the 
relationship between underwriter reputation and stock performance to determine if the 
relationship found for first IPOs exists for RLBOs. 
1.2. Organization of the Dissertation 
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. The first essay is presented in 
Chapter 2 and includes an introduction, literature review, hypothesis development, data sources, 
methodology, results, and conclusions. Chapter 3 includes the second essay and is organized 
similarly to Chapter 2. Overall conclusions are discussed in Chapter 4. Tables and figures are 
included in appendices at the end of the dissertation. 
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Chapter 2: Reverse Leveraged Buyouts: What Happens During the 
Private Period? 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Reverse leveraged buy-outs (RLBOs) are receiving increased attention from finance 
researchers and the business media in recent years due to their significant growth as a percentage 
of the U.S. buyout industry.1  While prior research has focused on the financial and stock price 
performance after the RLBO (see e.g. Cao and Lerner, 2009, Holthausen and Larcker, 1996, 
among others), the business media, enamored by the currency of these transactions, speculate 
based on anecdotal evidence on the types of restructurings that are undertaken during the private 
period.2 To date, however, researchers remain silent on the restructuring initiatives undertaken 
during the private period from LBO to RLBO. 
Based on a comprehensive sample of public-to-private RLBOs, the following questions are 
addressed: What types of restructurings, in terms of changes in operating, financial and cost 
structures, are typically undertaken during the private period? What private period actions 
determine post-RLBO valuation? What role does private period length play in the firm’s 
financial performance (success) after the RLBO? Is the firm’s vulnerability to the market for 
corporate control related to private period initiatives? 
                                                 
1 Cao and Lerner (2009) find that from 1981 to 1999, RLBOs represented 8.25 percent of all IPO offerings.  They 
report that this grew to 18.64 percent of all public offerings from 2000 to 2003.  In addition, the RLBO has 
significant wealth implications for investors.  Cao and Lerner report, that from 1981 to 1999, the gross proceeds 
from the RLBOs in their sample averaged $105.73 million per deal.  This is almost twice as large as the average 
proceeds of $55.52 million from other IPOs.   
2 A good example can be found in the following quote from the February 17, 2006 issue of Business Week 
concerning the 2006 RLBO by Burger King, “Burger King's total revenue for the last half of 2005 was up 5 percent 
to $1.02 billion, income from operations was up 29 percent to $142 million and net income (after including the debt 
burden from the LBO and paying Uncle Sam) was up 9 percent to $49 million. How to explain the improvement in 
operating income? Standard LBO playbook -- cut expenses. S, G & A dropped 10 percent even as sales rose. The 
bad news, though, was that comparable store sales were pretty weak, up just 1.3 percent in the second half of 2005 
versus a 7 percent gain in the comparable period of 2004”.  Another example is this quote which appeared in the 
December 10, 2007 issue of Forbes, “Beware the quick flip; such deals tend to underperform the S&P Index in the 
three years after listing.” 
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The uniqueness of RLBOs is demonstrated by findings that show only a small fraction of 
LBOs return to public capital markets. Kaplan and Stromberg’s (2009) LBO study finds that 
only 14 percent of their firms subsequently exit private domain by conducting an RLBO. Guo, 
Hotchkiss, and Song (2010) and Mehran and Peristiani (2010) obtain similar results. Further, 
Kaplan (1991), and Van de Gucht and Moore (1998) show that RLBO probability does not peak 
until several years into the private period. Their findings provide additional motivation to 
understand restructuring activities during the private period. Hence, a study of RLBOs that 
uncovers restructuring actions during the private period will enable us to understand what 
distinguishes these transactions from other public offerings. 
This study complements and expands on prior research by considering public-to-private-
to-public firms only. I begin by compiling a comprehensive sample of 208 public-to-private 
RLBOs for the period, 1978 to 2006. By restricting the study to public-to-private-to-pubic 
transactions, I can discern changes in profitability and valuation, financial structure, operating 
structure, and cost structure by examining firm characteristics pre-LBO compared to post-RLBO. 
The analysis is supplemented by examining firm data one year before and after the LBO, as well 
as the year immediately preceding and following the RLBO. This research design facilitates 
understanding what types of actions are typically undertaken during the private period.   
The analysis contributes to the RLBO literature in a number of ways. First, leading up to 
the LBO, I find that sample firms expend more resources on capital expenditures than 
competitors, while their growth options are at par with rivals. These factors in combination with 
low ownership concentration and excess free cash flow suggest the existence of overinvestment. 
Second, the increased leverage from the LBO transaction leads to significant declines in 
free cash flow and capital expenditures during the private period, while ownership concentration 
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increases—all of which alleviate agency problems. As agency issues may manifest in 
overinvestment, the evidence of downsizing during the private period is consistent with 
increased management discipline. 
Third, after emerging from the private period, I document that employee productivity and 
gross margin improve relative to competition. Further, the results show that firm’s growth 
opportunities and free cash flow are above industry levels as the newly public firm deleverages. 
In addition, capital expenditures remain at industry norms indicating that agency issues remain 
under control post-RLBO. 
Fourth, the evidence suggests that private period restructuring which improves growth 
prospects and reduces cost structure leads to higher post-RLBO valuations. I also find that firm 
value at the RLBO is positively associated with the concentrated ownership. Finally, equity 
markets respond more favorably at the RLBO to restructuring which reduces overhead and 
increases investments in research and development. Overall, the findings support Jensen’s (1986) 
proposition that leveraged buyouts provide the incentives that motivate management to act in the 
interest of shareholders. 
Fifth, I also find evidence that sample firms are subject to higher taxes in the pre-LBO 
period than their counterparts, which implies that LBO firms were under-levered. Higher levels 
of long-term debt lead to substantial reductions in marginal tax rates following the RLBO. 
Sixth, insights are obtained into the relationship between firm fundamentals at the LBO 
and private period duration. The findings show that the private period is negatively correlated 
with leverage, intangible assets, and employee productivity. The evidence suggests that firms 
spend less time restructuring when the term structure of interest rates is steep, and during active 
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leveraged buyout markets. In contrast, firms that pay out excess cash as dividends remain private 
longer. 
Seventh, evidence is obtained that explains the high post-RLBO attrition rate documented in 
the literature. Firms which use private period restructuring to develop new growth opportunities 
have a higher probability of long-run independence post-RLBO, while a reverse relationship 
exists for excessive personnel reductions. I also find that active leveraged buyout markets and 
high marginal tax rates reduce post-RLBO takeover probability. Finally, the results imply that a 
nonlinear relationship exists between private period duration and the probability of remaining 
independent post-RLBO. I argue that public-to-private RLBOs after an extremely long private 
period more closely resembles a first IPO. 
The results are robust to controlling for potential endogeneity and the influence of outliers. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the background 
literature on RLBOs. Section 2.3 describes the sample selection process and the data sources. 
The empirical findings are presented in Section 2.4. Section 2.6 then concludes. 
2.2. Literature Background 
The transition from public-to-private and then public again is complex with many factors 
to consider. In understanding this process, I next summarize prior RLBO research beginning 
with studies of the benefits from LBOs. I then discuss articles investigating post-event operating 
performance. Studies on the probability of conducting an RLBO after the LBO are reviewed, 
followed by a summary of research into agency costs in the process. The literature review 
concludes by discussing one international study of RLBOs. 
2.2.1. The Gains from LBOs 
Previous literature examines the gains from LBOs in the 1980s and find increased leverage 
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provide benefits to such firms through reduction in agency problems and more robust tax shields 
from interest deductions (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice, 1984, Lehn and Poulsen, 1989, and 
Kaplan, 1989b). 
2.2.2. RLBO Operating Performance 
In the RLBO literature, prior work has focused primarily on post-event performance of 
division-to-private and private-to-private transactions. For example, Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
(1990) analyze 72 RLBOs (including 18 public-to-private RLBOs) from 1983 to 1987, and 
detect significant improvements in profitability due to lower costs, while Mian and Rosenfeld 
(1993) find that operating margins of 85 RLBOs (53 are division-to-private RLBOs) improve 
during restructuring. Earlier work on management buyouts also document significant increases in 
operating returns after the private period (Kaplan, 1989a and Smith, 1990).3 
Extending the analysis to four years post RLBO, Holthausen and Larcker (1996) find that 
fundamentals are better than the industry. However, their results contrast with Degeorge and 
Zeckhauser (1993) who document lower performance after the RLBO compared to before. In a 
recent study, Cao (2011) shows that post-RLBO underperformance is concentrated in firms 
remaining private less than a year. Previous research also provides evidence of declines in 
leverage post-RLBO (Mian and Rosenfield, 1993), and decreases in insider ownership 
(Holthausen and Larcker, 1996). 
2.2.3. Post-RLBO Attrition 
Kaplan’s (1991) study reports a high attrition rate that is also obtained by Mian and 
Rosenfield (1993), where 40 percent of their samples are taken over within three years of the 
RLBO. In the same vein, Holthausen and Larcker (1996) find that over one-third of their sample 
is de-listed within four years post-RLBO. The high post-RLBO attrition rate is an empirical 
                                                 
3 Smith’s (1990) sample of 53 MBOs includes 17 RLBOs. 
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regularity that prior research has yet to explain, leaving a gap in the literature addressed in this 
chapter. 
2.2.4. Agency Costs and the RLBO 
Post-RLBO agency costs are another topic of past research, where Holthausen and Larcker 
(1996) find decreasing insider ownership after the event, while Mian and Rosenfield (1993) 
report declining leverage. Mian and Rosenfield (1993) also show that post-RLBO takeovers are 
characterized by greater outside investor participation, and lower ownership by officers and 
directors. In contrast, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) and Bruton, Keels, and Scifres (2002) 
find that ownership is still concentrated post-RLBO, suggesting an improved governance 
structure. This study complements and expands on these articles by considering public-to-
private-to-public firms. 
2.2.5. International RLBOs 
Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) examine 321 United Kingdom buyouts over 1995 to 
2004, by analyzing realized value increases after the event.4 They show that valuation is 
positively related to improved post-LBO governance such as increased managerial equity 
holdings. As such, they provide additional evidence consistent with agency theory by showing 
that the likelihood of positive returns is related to acquisitions carried out while private. One 
interesting aspect of this study is that RLBOs are as common in the United Kingdom as in the 
United States, suggesting that firms are responding to agency issues occurring in the Berle and 
Means (1932) corporations common in both countries. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Their sample includes 52 RLBOs. 
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2.3. Sample Selection Process and Data Sources 
2.3.1. RLBO Terminology 
In this study I employ terminology typically used to define transitions surrounding the 
private period, namely the leveraged buyout (LBO) followed by the reverse leveraged buyout 
(RLBO). The LBO defines the transfer from initial public trading to the private period, while a 
second initial public offering denotes the RLBO. Further, the term RLBO is typically used to 
describe three distinct classes of these transactions. Public-to-private RLBOs occur when firms 
are independent and publicly traded companies before the LBO and after the RLBO, in contrast 
to division-to-private or private-to-private transactions. Division-to-private RLBOs involve a 
segment of a company pre-LBO, and as such more closely resemble highly levered equity carve 
outs.5 Private-to-private RLBOs occur when an unlisted company is acquired by a private equity 
group and subsequently taken public via an IPO.6  
2.3.2. Data Sources 
A common approach in the literature is to commingle private-to-private and division-to- 
private RLBOs with public-to-private RLBOs.7 The results from such comingling would reflect 
different attributes and starting points for the firms taken private. I examine public-to-private-to-
public transaction. This research design has two advantages: First, I am able to track the same 
firm across the different parts of its journey— from being public to going private and up to a few 
years following going public after restructuring. Second, the comingling of different types of 
                                                 
5 Celestial Seasonings is an example of a division to private RLBO, which was owned by Kraft Foods prior to the 
LBO. 
6 One example of a private equity group is Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts. 
7 For example, Kaplan (1991) examines 183 leveraged buyouts from 1979 through 1986.  A majority of Kaplan’s 
sample are divisions of public companies at the time of the LBO.  The study also finds that approximately 45 
percent of the buyouts eventually conduct a second IPO. Cao and Lerner (2009) report that their sample of 437 firms 
includes 307 private to private, 96 division to private, and 34 public to private RLBOs. 
 
11 
 
going private transactions ignores the fact that private-to-private and division-to-private 
transactions may have a completely different motivation than public-to-private.  
As Bharath and Dittmar (2010) show, there are different economic forces at play in 
private and public firms. For example, unlike public-to-private transactions, private-to-private 
transactions do not forgo benefits of liquidity when they go private. Further, firms that undergo 
public-to-private transactions tend to be larger than industry as opposed to private-to-private 
which are more likely to be smaller and hence, more likely to suffer from adverse selection. The 
research design of a sample comprised exclusively of public-to-private RLBOs allows me to 
draw clean and reliable conclusions about firm activities from pre-LBO through post-RLBO. 
Compiling a comprehensive list of these transactions entails hand-collection of data from 
different sources since there is no one definitive database for such transactions.  
I undertake a multi-step process using several sources to create an exhaustive sample of 
public-to-private-to-public transactions. I start with the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) 
database to obtain RLBO transactions from 1978 to 1998. Mergers and Acquisitions data 
provides information on LBOs with a future IPO, while the New Issues table contains data on 
IPOs with a previous LBO. These two sources are then verified against each other. Because SDC 
stopped tracking RLBOs after 1998, the sample is expanded with IPOs from 1999 to 2006, 
which are then matched against the existing list of LBOs. The SDC data is supplemented with 
the sample from Cao and Lerner (2009).8  
Next, the Gale Business and Company Resource Center is used to validate candidate 
RLBOs by reviewing each firm’s history, verifying that a company was publicly listed, privately 
held, and then public again. I also use this source to identify name changes taking place over the 
private period, and verify that SDC transaction dates are accurate. For example, SDC often 
                                                 
8 I thank Jerry Cao and Josh Lerner for making their list of public to private RLBOs available to me. 
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defines the LBO as when the firm was first acquired by a private equity firms (such as Kohlberg, 
Kravis and Roberts), even if the firm previously was taken private in a management buyout 
(MBO). Additionally, news articles related to the firm are also obtained from Gale for pertinent 
information.  
Firm names before the LBO and after the RLBO are then used to search the Compustat 
Names table, as well as the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Stocknames file, 
enabling identification of all required CUSIP codes. The CRSP delisting code is also verified to 
confirm that it is for a merger or acquisition. Additional requirements include that firm data is 
available in both Compustat and CRSP. This results in a comprehensive sample of 208 public-to-
private RLBOs for the period, 1978 to 2006. Appendix B contains a list of all databases utilized 
in this dissertation. 
Table 1, Panel A, reports sample transactions by year for both the LBO and the RLBO. 
There is a cluster of transactions for the years 1984 to 1989, corroborating previous research that 
in these years Drexel, Burnham, and Lambert financed a large volume of LBOs using junk 
bonds.9 In Panel B, firms are grouped by private period duration, and approximately 60 percent 
go public again in less than five years, with almost 25 percent conducting an RLBO within two 
years. The business media has coined the phrase “quick flip” to describe these transactions.  
Panel C shows that median (mean) time in the private period is 4.4 (5.4) years, which is 
somewhat longer than that reported in earlier studies.10 The longer private period is due to the 
fact that duration has generally increased since the year 2000 and perhaps because the sample is 
composed exclusively of public-to-private RLBOs. For example, some MBOs are later acquired 
by a private equity firm (typically called a second LBO), which leads to two private periods. 
                                                 
9 I note that over half (57 percent) of the LBOs are management buyouts (MBO). 
10 For example, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) obtain a median private period of slightly more than 3.0 years. 
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RLBOs by 2-digit SIC code are reported in Panel D, and the sample is spread uniformly across 
industries.   
2.4. Empirical Results 
2.4.1. Univariate Analysis 
Table 2 reports univariate results examining firm profitability, valuation, financial 
restructuring, operating restructuring, and cost structure from pre-LBO (LBO-0) through post-
RLBO (RLBO+0). First, firm fundamentals in the year of the LBO are compared to those at the 
RLBO. Next, in Table 3 the analysis is expanded by accessing private period data existing for a 
subset of firms, to examine changes surrounding both the LBO and RLBO. This approach 
reveals types of restructuring taking place during the private period and later I examine how 
these changes impact post-RLBO performance.  
Following Barber and Lyon (1996) I apply the Wilcoxon signed rank test of medians in the 
univariate analysis. Additionally, since RLBOs lead to significant changes in asset composition, 
several variables are standardized by sales (such as free cash flow, EBITDA, capital 
expenditures, research and development expenses, advertising, cost of goods sold and selling, 
general and administrative expenses). However, to maintain comparability between leverage, 
taxes and interest expense, and not confound results with changes in market conditions, I follow 
Cao (2011) and normalize these variables with book value of assets. Market-to-book ratio 
(MktBook) is employed to proxy for firm valuation and to measure future growth options, while 
price-to-sales (PSlsRatio) serves as the equity multiple.11 
In Table 2, I present changes from the year of the LBO (LBO-0) to the year of the RLBO 
(RLBO+0). Panel A reports findings using unadjusted variables, while Panel B documents 
industry-adjusted variables. Industry values are based on the yearly median value for each 2-digit 
                                                 
11 I note that market-to-book is equivalent to Tobin’s Q. 
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SIC code. In Panel B I also test whether industry-adjusted values at LBO-0 and RLBO+0 differ 
statistically from zero. Univariate analysis in Table 3 reports results for the subsample of firms 
with private period data surrounding the LBO and the RLBO. Panel A of this table reports 
industry-adjusted results at the LBO compared to those one year later (LBO+1), while a similar 
analysis comparing variables before (RLBO-1) and at the RLBO (RLBO+0) is included in Panel 
B of Table 3. 
2.4.1.1. Changes in Profitability and Valuation 
Table 2 (Panel A) shows that there is no significant change in unadjusted return on assets 
(ROA) during the private period, namely from before the LBO to after the RLBO. However, 
Panel B of the table reveals that the industry-adjusted ROA is positive and highly significant at 
both the LBO and the RLBO. Although firm performance improves during the private period, the 
improvement is not statistically different from zero.  
In Table 3 I report that ROA declines significantly one year surrounding the LBO. 
However, the evidence suggests that this trend is reversed during the private period, as ROA is 
positive and highly significant both one year before and the year after the RLBO, but the change 
surrounding the RLBO is statistically insignificant. The combination of these results implies that 
firms that undergo LBO transactions are not underperforming firms.  
Table 2, Panel A indicates that sample firms experience substantial improvement in growth 
opportunities during the private period as market-to-book (MktBook) increases significantly over 
this time. Panel B results are similar as pre-LBO MktBook is at par with the industry, but 
significantly increases following the RLBO. Opler and Titman (1993) argue that LBOs are 
characterized by poor growth opportunities; however, my results do not substantiate that 
argument. To ensure that my results are not impacted by the years studied, I group the sample 
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into time periods aligned with Opler and Titman (1993), and my results hold for the same era 
they analyze.12 The analysis also reveals that both unadjusted and industry-adjusted price-to-
sales (PSlsRatio) increases substantially during the private period. The findings imply that 
private period restructuring improves the firms’ growth opportunities as well as their equity 
valuation multiple. 
I use free cash flow to sales (FCF/Sales) to provide evidence on operating cash flows and 
how restructuring influences insiders’ use of these funds. Free cash flow to sales (FCF/Sales) 
changes little over the private period whether the variable is raw or industry-adjusted. Similarly, 
I find that FCF/Sales is significantly greater than that of the industry immediately preceding the 
LBO and subsequent to the RLBO. The high free cash flow prior to the LBO is consistent with 
previous literature and reflects lesser need by these firms to access capital markets.  
As expected, post-LBO FCF/Sales declines relative to that of the industry, and the 
difference is highly significant. If proceeds from the public offering are used to pay down debt, 
then post-RLBO free cash flow should rise. The findings are consistent with this prediction as 
there is a highly significant increase in FCF/Sales from the year preceding RLBO to one year 
following the RLBO. Figure 1 graphs FCF/Sales from before the LBO to after the RLBO.  
The analysis reveals a highly significant increase in EBITDA/Sales over the private period. 
However, the evidence suggests that this trend is not at par with the corresponding industry-wide 
improvement, as EBITDA/Sales declines relative to competition. Immediately surrounding the 
LBO, there is a highly significant improvement in EBITDA/Sales. In contrast, I find the opposite 
effect surrounding the RLBO, and the decline is highly significant. One explanation for the 
changes in ROA and EBITDA/Sales surrounding the LBO is that asset write-ups lead to increased 
                                                 
12 Results not tabulated for conciseness. 
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depreciation and amortization. Additionally, declining EBITDA/Sales while ROA remains 
unchanged, suggests that tax savings play a role in post-LBO benefits.  
Retained earnings to assets (RetTA) provide additional evidence on profitability.13 Pre-
LBO industry-adjusted RetTA is positive, economically material, and highly significant, while 
after restructuring the same variable is negative and statistically differs from zero at the 1 percent 
level.  In addition, changes in RetTA over this time are negative and at better than a 1 percent 
confidence level on both a raw and industry-adjusted basis. Private period changes in RetTA 
appear to be concentrated at the LBO, as changes surrounding the RLBO are not statistically 
different from zero. One possible explanation for these findings is that divestitures after asset 
write-ups generate large losses on disposal, which leads to the observed decrease. 
2.4.1.2. Financial Restructuring 
The evidence in Table 2 suggests that substantive changes in capital structure take place 
over the RLBO process. Firms rely more on debt (Leverage) post-RLBO compared to pre-LBO 
whether using raw or industry-adjusted variables, and the increases are highly significant. Not 
surprisingly, Table 3 documents that Leverage increases dramatically from 0.099 to 0.427 
surrounding the LBO. In contrast, there is a large and highly significant drop in Leverage post-
RLBO, suggesting that the proceeds from the offering are used to reduce debt. 14 Figure 2 maps 
trends in Leverage from before the LBO to after the RLBO. 
As expected, changes in InterestTA mirror those of Leverage. On an industry-adjusted 
basis the variable is insignificant pre-LBO, but increases to a positive and highly significant 
value at the RLBO. I find statistically significant growth in InterestTA during the private period 
                                                 
13 See studies by Ohlson (1995) and Dhaliwal, Erickson, Frank, and Banyi (2003) from the accounting literature. 
Altman’s (1968) Z-Score, which predicts financial distress, provides an example from the finance literature. 
14 As long-term debt can substitute for short-term credit, notes payable to assets is examined (not reported for 
conciseness). While the unadjusted variable declines during restructuring, this appears to be an industry effect as the 
industry-adjusted variable is insignificant. 
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for both raw and industry-adjusted values. Focusing on changes surrounding the LBO, the 
evidence suggests that InterestTA increases substantially. However, this trend is reversed at the 
RLBO, as there is a significant decrease due to the reduction in long-term debt. 
Higher leverage is likely responsible for the decrease in taxes to total assets (TaxRate), 
where the effective rate of almost 33 percent pre-LBO decreases to slightly more than 18 percent 
as the firm emerges from the private period restructuring. The decrease is significant at the 1 
percent level and supported by industry-adjusted results that are qualitatively similar. Further, at 
the LBO, industry-adjusted TaxRate is positive and significant at 5 percent, which declines 
significantly to a negative value one year into the private period.  At the RLBO, the downward 
trend in taxes is reversed, where a negative and highly significant value pre-offering becomes 
insignificant one year later. Overall the results support Kaplan’s (1989b) findings that RLBOs 
create value through tax benefits.15 
I employ cash to total assets (CashTA) as a proxy for liquidity, which declines significantly 
from LBO to RLBO on both a raw and industry-adjusted basis. In addition, while CashTA is at 
industry levels pre-LBO, it becomes negative and highly significant after the private period. 
Table 3 indicates that there is a decline in CashTA surrounding the LBO that is statistically 
different from zero, and it is negative and highly significant one year into the private period. 
However, I detect no impact on CashTA surrounding the RLBO as differences over this year are 
insignificant.16 These changes reflect a more stringent cash policy when the firm is private which 
is maintained when the firm re-emerges publicly. 
                                                 
15 Tax loss carry-forwards also shield firms from taxes. In unreported results, I find a significant increase in raw and 
industry-adjusted tax loss carryforwards during restructuring. 
16 In unreported results, net working capital increases significantly surrounding the RLBO. One possible explanation 
is that increased business activity leads to greater inventories and accounts receivable, while an alternative, but not 
mutually exclusive rationale is that current liabilities and payables are reduced by the RLBO. I find that the 
inventory turnover ratio declines over this time. Since firm sales are increasing, this suggests that inventories are 
growing, which is consistent with the first explanation. 
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Raw and industry-adjusted dividends to total assets (DivTA) decreases significantly during 
the private period. However, it is important to note that RLBOs still pay an above industry level 
of dividends even after the private period. Results reported in Table 3 suggest that dividend 
declines occur at the LBO, but the change surrounding the RLBO is insignificant. Substantial 
leverage increases due to the LBO, as well as tighter liquidity, may explain dividend reductions 
during the private period. 
Ownership concentration (Shares/Owner) increases significantly from 3,020 shares per 
equityholder at the LBO to a post-RLBO level of 48,000. While industry-adjusted Shares/Owner 
is insignificant pre-LBO, this grows to a highly significant value post-RLBO. This increase in 
ownership concentration during the private period is significant at the 1 percent level. Although 
the decline in Shares/Owner after the RLBO is statistically significant, it is still above the 
corresponding industry norm. Thus, the change in the ownership structure prompted by the LBO 
transaction is maintained to some degree after the RLBO. 
2.4.1.3. Operations Restructuring and Changes in Cost Structure 
Table 2 shows that the real book value of assets (Assets), based on either raw or industry-
adjusted basis, does not change significantly during the private period.17 Although the typical 
sample firm is larger than the industry both before the LBO (going into the private period) and 
after the RLBO (emerging from the private period), this finding may be influenced by asset 
write-ups at the LBO, and results reported in Table 3 are consistent with this possibility.18 The 
analysis reveals a significant increase in Assets surrounding both the LBO as well as the 
                                                 
17  I adjust book value of assets and net sales to the base year 2000 using the consumer price index (CPI).  The CPI 
data are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website www.bls.gov. 
18 I find that firms taken private through a management buyout (MBO) have significantly lower Assets before and 
after the private period compared to transactions without management participation. 
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RLBO.19,20 My sample firms experience substantial declines in Sales during the private period 
relative to the industry. However, private period restructuring bears fruit as firms generate above 
industry-level sales within a year following the RLBO as evidenced by the statistically 
significant increase in sales from pre-RLBO to post-RLBO window. 
Since asset write-ups at the LBO can obfuscate asset restructuring, I investigate 
restructuring of tangibles as captured by property, plant, and equipment (PPETA). I find that this 
asset measure declines significantly during the private period. This decrease is highly significant 
not only on an absolute basis but also relative to the industry. Table 3 indicates that a substantial 
reduction in PPETA is executed within the first year of the firms entering the private period. The 
findings also indicate that the downsizing of PPETA is completed prior to the year before the 
firm goes public again.  
Table 2 shows that personnel counts (Employees), both raw and industry-adjusted, decline 
significantly over the private period, an indication of firms engaging in restructuring to improve 
efficiency and productivity. However, Table 3 shows that these actions do not typically occur 
near the LBO, as the difference in Employees pre- and post-LBO is insignificant. The combined 
evidence from Tables 2 and 3 suggest that substantive personnel reductions begin at least one 
year into the private period. However, employment levels increase significantly from pre-RLBO 
to one year after going public again.  
The findings indicate the above restructuring leads to efficiency gains in employee 
productivity for the sample firm on both an absolute basis as well as relative to the industry. As 
employment declines over the private period, there is a highly significant increase in sales per 
                                                 
19 In unreported results, I find a decline in Sales/Assets over this time, which is significant at the 1 percent level. 
20 The Compustat Segment files are also examined for changes in firm structure, where firms without data are 
assumed to have one segment. There is no evidence of changes in business segments over the private period, as the 
mean number of segments at the LBO (1.428) is virtually the same as those found at the RLBO (1.452). 
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employee (Sales/Employee). The industry-adjusted results are qualitatively similar. Overall, 
private period restructuring leads to improved efficiency as indicated by the increase in revenue 
generated per employee. This significant improving trend in Sales/Employee continues after the 
RLBO. I present a graph of Sales/Employee from before the LBO to after the RLBO in Figure 3. 
The findings suggest that there is overinvestment prior to the LBO in terms of capital 
expenditures to sales (Capex/Sales). Specifically, the industry-adjusted Capex/Sales is positive 
and significant pre-LBO but insignificant post-RLBO. Declines in Capex/Sales that are 
statistically different from zero occur during the private period in terms of both raw and industry-
adjusted values.  Leading up to the RLBO, Capex/Sales is negative and significant at 5 percent, 
while one year later, the variable is insignificant. These trends are depicted in Figure 4. 
Examining cost structure, I find that cost of goods sold to sales (COGSSls) changes 
markedly from LBO to RLBO. The decrease in COGSSls on both an unadjusted basis, as well as 
relative to the industry is accompanied by increases in gross margin. I also find that the changes 
surrounding the LBO and RLBO are insignificant, suggesting that longer private periods are 
required to effect improvements in margins. 
Table 2 shows that the sample firms are characterized by below industry-level selling, 
general, and administrative expenses to sales (SG&A/Sales) for both at the LBO and at the 
RLBO, perhaps due to economies of scale given that sample firms tend to be larger than the 
industry norm. Further, changes in SG&A/Sales during the private period are insignificant for 
both raw and industry-adjusted values. This suggests that private period restructuring improves 
gross margin, but not overhead expenses that are already below the industry norms when 
entering the private period. Table 3 indicates that changes in SG&A/Sales around the LBO are 
insignificant but there is a significant decrease surrounding the RLBO. 
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Research and development expenditures (R&D/Sales) are another avenue firms can explore 
during restructuring. Industry-adjusted R&D/Sales at the LBO is similar to that of industry 
counterparts, while after the private period it is significantly lower than that of rivals. Higher 
post-restructuring leverage may incentivize reduced investments in R&D. I note that changes in 
R&D/Sales surrounding the LBO and RLBO are insignificant. 
2.4.1.4. Private Period Outliers 
Five of the sample firms have a private period less than 60 days, where in one case the 
RLBO occurs 10 days after a buyout after being held up by a shareholder lawsuit. However, to 
preclude the possibility that the results are driven by these extreme values, I repeat the analysis 
of Table 2 excluding these firms, and obtain qualitatively similar results, with coefficients 
consistently having the same sign and magnitude.  
2.4.2. RLBO Performance by Time in the Private Period 
The findings so far suggest that substantial restructuring takes place during the private 
period. However, there is a wide variation in the time spent restructuring, raising interesting 
questions on the relationship between private period length and post-RLBO success. As 
mentioned previously, the business media warns about the so-called “quick flip,” where too short 
a restructuring interval leads to post-RLBO underperformance. I now explore the validity of that 
warning in Table 4, which reports industry-adjusted firm fundamentals by quartiles of private 
period length.21 I also compare the shortest quartile (Q1) to the longest quartile (Q4) using an 
unpaired test of group medians.   
2.4.2.1. Profitability and Valuation 
Firms with the shortest private period earn lower post-RLBO returns on equity (ROE) than 
those in a longer restructuring, and the difference is significant at the 5 percent level. Further, 
                                                 
21 The table only reports quartiles 1 and 4 for conciseness. 
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ROE for Q1 drops significantly over the private period, while the change for Q4 is not 
statistically different from zero. In contrast, no substantive differences in ROA and 
EBITDA/Sales are detected between quartiles. One explanation for this finding is that wealth 
transfers from shareholders to creditors are concentrated in firms with shorter private periods. 
There are also no detectable differences for FCF/Sales by private period length. 
I find noticeable differences due to private period length in pre-LBO valuations. Both 
PlsRatio and MktBook, are lower before the LBO for Q1 compared to Q4, and the differences are 
significant at the 5 percent level. However, by the RLBO changes in PSlsRatio across quartiles 
are not statistically different from zero, while firms remaining private longer still demonstrate a 
significantly higher MktBook. These findings suggest that restructuring duration is positively 
related to post-RLBO firm valuation, but has no discernable impact on equity values after 
restructuring. 
2.4.2.2. Financial Restructuring 
Pre-LBO capital structure is varies by private period length, as Q1 firms already have 
higher Leverage than their competition, while the same variable for Q4 firms is insignificant. 
Consequently, the quartiles differ statistically at the 1 percent level before the LBO. In contrast, 
after restructuring Leverage of both quartiles has converged to similar levels. This implies that 
there is an optimal capital structure at the RLBO, where restructuring irrespective of length leads 
to qualitatively similar levels of long-term debt. 
As interest expense is intrinsically related to long-term debt, the findings for InterestTA are 
the same as those found for Leverage, where differences between quartiles existing pre-LBO 
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disappear by the RLBO. Not surprisingly, private period duration has an inverse relationship to 
TaxRate compared to those found for interest and long-term debt.22  
I find that firms with shorter private periods have less liquidity before the LBO, as CashTA 
for Q1 differs statistically from that of Q4 at the 1 percent level. However, by the RLBO both 
quartiles are similarly below industry norms. In a related finding, Q4 firms pay significantly 
higher levels of dividends pre-LBO, while by the RLBO dividends are at similar above industry 
levels irrespective of private period length.  
2.4.2.3. Operating Restructuring and Changes in Cost Structure 
There is little evidence that private period length is related to Assets, which may be 
impacted by write-ups from the LBO. Sales provide a measure of firm size not impacted by 
accounting at the LBO, and the results are consistent with smaller firms remaining private a 
shorter time, where the quartiles differ statistically at the 1 percent level post-RLBO. 
Personnel counts are an alternative measure of scale and both quartiles are qualitatively 
similar pre-LBO. After restructuring, Employees for Q4 is significantly greater than for Q1. By 
grouping the sample into quartiles of private period duration, I am able to discern evidence of 
divestitures occurring among firms with the shortest private periods. 
Pre-LBO cost structure differs by private period length. First, Q4 firms have higher 
SG&A/Sales than their Q1 counterparts, while firms spending a longer time restructuring also 
expend more on R&D/Sales. In both cases the difference are significant at the 5 percent level. 
However, restructuring ameliorates any differences, as by the RLBO all cost structure variables 
are qualitatively the same irrespective of quartile. 
                                                 
22 Tax loss carryforwards are another avenue by which firms can shield income from taxes. In results not tabulated 
for conciseness, a shorter private period is associated with higher tax loss carryforwards at the LBO. However, 
differences disappear by the RLBO, suggesting that tax benefits are correlated with private period duration, as firms 
with sufficient loss carryforwards cannot take advantage of the debt shield. 
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2.4.2.4. Long-run Status after the RLBO 
Kaplan’s (1991) study shows that RLBOs experience above average attrition and this 
sample also demonstrates this tendency. Out of 208 firms that exit restructuring, sixty-four are no 
longer publicly traded within five years. A majority of the delistings (53) result from mergers 
and acquisitions, while only 11 firms delist for bankruptcy/insufficient capital. The remaining 
144 firms are still publicly traded five years post-RLBO. 
The evidence suggests that private period length is related to post-RLBO status. In 
unreported results, firms delisted for mergers have a median private period of 3.4 years 
compared to 4.7 for those publicly traded after five years, and the difference is significant at 5 
percent. One explanation for this finding is that too short a private period results in ineffective 
restructuring, leaving the firm vulnerable to the market for corporate control. Alternatively, some 
“quick flips” may be used by incumbent management to reduce or dispose of their investment.  
2.4.3. Multivariate Analysis 
Next, in order to determine how restructuring impacts post-RLBO valuation, I use 
regression analysis to explore the relationship between changes in fundamentals during the 
private period and market-to-book ratio and price-to-sales multiple. I test cost structure, 
investments, ownership concentration, and growth in determining what factors drive post-RLBO 
values. Several robustness checks are performed to validate the key findings. The valuation 
results are reinforced by an analysis of the factors driving free cash flow at both the LBO and 
RLBO. I then investigate those ex-ante factors impacting restructuring length, and why RLBOs 
experience such a high attrition rate. 
 
 
25 
 
2.4.3.1. What Determines Valuation after the RLBO? 
Table 5, Panel A presents regressions with the equity valuation multiple, price-to-sales 
ratio (PSlsRatio), as the dependent variable, while Panel B displays the same specifications using 
firm valuation proxy market-to-book ratio (MktBook) as the regressor.23 The control variables 
include Assets, Leverage, RLBOYears, a dummy set to one for firms delisted for reasons other 
than a merger (Delist), and a variable proxying for the yield curve (TermPremium). Several 
specifications of equation (1) below are reported in Table 5, where all firm fundamentals are 
industry-adjusted and defined in Appendix A. 
       Valuation = f(Assets, Leverage, PPETA, COGS/Sls, Growth, Delist, ∆Capex/Sales,  
∆R&D/Sales, ∆Shares/Own, ∆SG&A/Sales, RLBOYears, TermPremium)    (1) 
With regard to control variables, the results show that valuation is not influenced by firm 
size, tangibles or leverage. Further, the delisting status of the firm post-RLBO is also not 
material to firm valuation at the RLBO.  
Turning to the focus variables, a key finding is the negative and highly significant 
coefficients on COGSSls in all specifications implying that equity markets value restructuring 
which improves gross margin. This also reinforces the univariate analysis presented in Table 2. 
Also important is that the sign and magnitude of the coefficient is consistent with the alternative 
representation of PSlsRatio as a factor of profit margin. Similarly, I find that restructuring that 
reduces overhead expenses (∆SG&A/Sales) improves post-RLBO equity values. The coefficients 
in Models 3 and 6 are negative and highly significant, with the expected sign.  
Another key determinant of equity valuation is growth in sales (Growth), which is 
positive and highly significant in all regressions. It stands to reason that effective restructuring 
                                                 
23 I note that Damodaran (2005) classifies PSlsRatio as an equity multiple, where price in the numerator can be 
represented as the product of profit margin, payout ratio, and the growth rate. 
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that results in sales growth that exceeds industry rivals should lead to higher market valuations. 
Similarly, coefficients for ∆R&D/Sales are economically and statistically significant in all 
models in which it is included with the expected positive sign. This finding reinforces those for 
Growth, and implies that restructuring which generates new investment opportunities improves 
equity valuation. In contrast, changes in capital expenditures (∆Capex/Sales) have little 
explanatory power for PSlsRatio, as the coefficient is not statistically different from zero.  
Theory predicts that equity held by insiders is positively related to stock valuation (see 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). I employ changes in ownership concentration (∆Shares/Own) to 
test this relationship. The coefficients on this variable are positive and significant in all models, 
and are consistent with Denis’ (1994) case study of Kroger and Safeway, which shows that 
increased insider ownership and long-term debt by the latter leads to superior post-RLBO 
returns.24 
Finally, additional evidence on the importance of cost structure is obtained, where the 
coefficient for ∆SG&A/Sales is negative and significant in Model 3. Leverage, which was 
insignificant in the first three specifications, is excluded in Models 4 to 6, and the results for the 
focus variables are qualitatively the same. 
For robustness, I employ industry-adjusted MktBook as another proxy for firm valuation. 
In Panel B I report a similar set of regressions to explain MktBook at the RLBO. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those obtained from Panel A with minor exceptions. For example, among 
the focus variables, COGSSls, Growth, ∆R&D/Sales, and ∆Shares/Own are statistically 
significant with the expected sign, similar to results obtained earlier when PSlsRatio was the 
dependent variable. However, ∆SG&A/Sales, although negative, is no longer significant in 
Models 2 and 3 suggesting that shareholders place greater value on low overhead than creditors 
                                                 
24 Safeway’s LBO was engineered by KKR, while Kroger chose to remain publicly traded through a recapitalization. 
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do. In addition, the coefficients on ∆Capex/Sales are now significantly positive in Models 3 and 
6 suggesting that increased capital expenditures improve firm value.  
One concern is whether my results are impacted by endogeneity from firms self-selecting a 
reverse leveraged buyout. In order to control for this possibility, the Heckman (1978) self-
selection model is applied. The first step Probit regression includes all firms with Compustat 
data, where the dependent variable (Selflg) is set to one for sample firms in the year of the LBO 
and zero otherwise. The choice of explanatory variables to predict leveraged buyouts included in 
equation (2) below are guided by the literature. 
Selflg = f(Sales, MktBook, DivDummy, R&D/Sales, Capex/Sales, CashTA,   
    Leverage, Turnover, FCF/Sales, PPETA)             (2) 
The Inverse Mills Ratio (Mills) from the first step becomes an extra independent variable 
in equation (1) and alleviates any omitted variable bias. The results suggest that my conclusions 
are not impacted by endogeneity.25 Consistent with the findings reported previously, coefficients 
retain the same sign, magnitude, and comparable levels of statistical significance. I next perform 
the robustness check used on Table 2 on results reported in the regressions of Tables 5, and again 
the findings hold. All coefficients have the same sign and magnitude, and statistical significance 
is virtually unchanged from results reported previously. 
In summary, the findings imply that restructuring that increases sales growth and 
improves gross margin consistently engender superior valuations. The evidence also shows that 
concentrated ownership and long-term debt resulting from the LBO translate into greater firm 
valuation. I interpret the results as showing that RLBOs lead to a capital investment policy that 
increases firm values after the firm is public again. In contrast, shareholders place greater 
importance on private period actions that reduce overhead expenses. Finally, consistent with the 
                                                 
25 Not tabulated for conciseness. 
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results for sales growth, investments in research and development improve equity values 
following the RLBO.   
2.4.3.2. The Ex-Ante Determinants of Private Period Duration 
While prior research investigates the relationship between post-RLBO variables and the 
time of restructuring, the literature has yet to explore the role of ex-ante factors in determining 
private period duration.26 In addition, the univariate analysis fails to account for the 
interrelatedness which may exist between variables. To control for these factors, Table 6, Panel 
A reports regressions using RLBOYears as the dependent variable. As RLBOYears is truncated at 
zero, a Tobit specification is employed to mitigate potential endogeneity.  
I include as control variables Assets, a dummy variable if the firm went private in a 
management buyout (MBO), and the same yield curve proxy used previously (TermPremium). I 
also control for the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) by creating a dummy that I 
interact with the tax (TaxRatePre1987 and TaxRatePost1986) and free cash flow focus variables 
(FCF/SalesPre1987 and FCF/SalesPost1986). Other pertinent ex-ante explanatory variables 
include DivTA, CashTA, Sales/Employee, ROE, IntanTA, R&D/Sales, Capex/Sales, and a 
variable proxying for a hot LBO market (LBOCount). All regressions are performed using 
industry-adjusted financial variables, which are defined in Appendix A. Several specifications of 
the function below are reported. 
        RLBOYears = f(Assets, Leverage, DivTA, CashTA, Sales/Employee, ROE,   
        IntanTA, R&D/Sales, Capex/Sales, FCF/SalesPre1987, FCF/SalesPost1986,    
       MBO, TaxRatePre1987, TaxRatePost1986, LBOCount, TermPremium)    
Where f( . ) > 0          (3) 
 
                                                 
26 See the study by Cao (2011). 
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2.4.3.2.1. Tobit Regressions of Private Period Duration 
First, I find that higher levels of long-term debt lead to a shorter private period, as 
Leverage is negative and statistically significant in all models. One possible explanation is that 
excessive long-term debt leads to less flexibility and funding to complete required restructuring. 
An alternative but not mutually exclusive explanation is that higher leverage imposes greater risk 
on undiversified firm insiders, which is reduced through a public offering. If the first explanation 
applies, then the private period should lengthen with liquidity, and the results for CashTA 
provide limited evidence of this, as the variable is positive and statistically significant in Model 
5, but insignificant in Model 4. 
Kaplan (1989b) shows that tax effects play an important role in leveraged buyouts, and 
the evidence presented so far suggests that marginal rates are higher than industry pre-LBO. 
However, TRA86 was an external event which lowered rates for all firms, which Newbould, 
Chatfield, and Anderson (1992) show reduces tax preferences resulting from LBOs.  
At the same time, other studies document that the effect of free cash flow in LBOs varies 
across time periods. In one example, Bharath and Dittmar (2010) find that free cash flow is a 
determinant of LBO probability in the 1980s, but not in subsequent years. Since FCF/Sales is 
calculated on an after-tax basis, an alternative interpretation is that Bharath and Dittmar (2010) 
are actually detecting the impact of TRA86.  
I investigate this possibility through two interaction terms (FCF/SalesPre1987 and 
FCF/SalesPost1986) to account for a differing relationship with the private period across eras. 
Both variables are included in Models 1 and 2, and FCF/SalesPost1986 is negative and highly 
significant, while FCF/SalesPre1987 is not statistically different from zero. A joint hypothesis 
rejects the null that the interaction terms are equal. Holding all other variables constant, these 
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results suggest that post-TRA86 free cash flow leads to a shorter private period than the same 
level pre-1987. 
Models 1 and 2 also include pre-LBO intangible assets (IntanTA) as an independent 
variable, and the coefficients are negative and highly significant. One explanation for why firms 
with more intangibles spend less time restructuring is that buyers overpay at the LBO, leading to 
a greater write-up of assets.27 Paying an excessive price then reduces internal resources available 
to restructure leading to a shorter private period. 
If firms invest in capital expenditures unwisely before the LBO, reduced cash flows post-
buyout should lead to a shorter private period. The findings when pre-LBO Capex/Sales is 
included in the specification are consistent with this, as the coefficient is negative and highly 
significant. Overall, this suggests that overinvestment leads to a shorter restructuring. 
Cao (2011) examines whether ex-post macroeconomic variables impact the private 
period.28 However, no previous study has investigated whether ex-ante economic conditions are 
relevant to the length of the private period. I test for the impact of hot buyout markets by 
including the number of LBOs in a month as an explanatory variable (LBOCount), and for the 
term structure of interest rates (TermPremium).29  
Both variables are included in Model 5, and the coefficient on TermPremium is negative 
and significant at the 5 percent level. This implies that a steep yield curve reduces the private 
period, suggesting that LBOs occurring during high interest rates have less financial slack to 
restructure. Turning to hot LBO markets, the coefficient on LBOCount is negative and highly 
                                                 
27 The amount paid over the market value of the assets is classified as intangibles. 
28 Cao (2011) includes variables proxying for hot IPO markets and average underpricing. 
29 Following the literature (see Barclay and Smith, 1995 and Guedes and Opler, 1996) the term premium is defined 
as the difference between a long-term t-bond (10 year) and a short-term t-bill (3 month). 
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significant, suggesting that “quick flips” are more likely during periods of high buyout activity. 
The other explanatory variables are not consistent determinants of private period duration.   
2.4.3.2.2. OLS Regressions of Private Period Duration 
While a Tobit regression is employed in Panel A to account for a truncated dependent 
variable, a concern with this approach is the requirement for normally distributed data. To test 
the robustness of this assumption, I follow Cao (2011) and use ordinary least squares regression 
with the natural logarithm of one plus RLBOYears as dependent variable. The results using this 
approach are reported in Panel B.  
First, all coefficients maintain the same sign as before. The explanatory power of long-
term debt and the macroeconomic variables are qualitatively the same as that using Tobit. The 
finding that the relationship between the private period and free cash flow is impacted by TRA86 
is as strong using OLS. Overinvestment before the LBO still leads to a shorter private period 
using OLS. The other independent variables are not consistently significant. 
2.4.3.3. The Determinants of Free Cash Flow 
The decision to use long-term debt to exit public equity markets is a momentous change 
in a firm’s financing. A leveraged buyout alters the capital structure by substituting debt for 
equity, and discontinuing public trading of the remaining stock. The evidence indicates that 
preceding the LBO free cash flow and capital expenditures are above competitive levels, while 
growth options are no better than industry. Free cash flow in and of itself is not necessarily 
terrible, as it indicates that current operations are profitable. However, Jensen’s (1986) theory 
suggests that free cash flow in combination with limited growth opportunities and a lack of 
management discipline incentivizes overinvestment.30 
                                                 
30 Stulz (1990) models the issue and obtains results consistent with Jensen’s (1986) predictions. 
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Once restructuring is complete, post-RLBO improvements in MktBook imply that the 
firm is facing a better set of investment opportunities. Further, reduced capital expenditures in 
combination with above industry levels of free cash flow indicate that management discipline 
increases as a result of restructuring. Consequently, I contend that these factors lead to higher 
valuations at the RLBO. Based on the above, the determinants of free cash flow after the RLBO 
will be substantively different from those before the leveraged buyout. 
In order to investigate this issue, I use multivariate analysis to study how these 
determinants change from LBO to RLBO. Table 5 presents results where the dependent variable 
is FCF/Sales. All firm fundamental variables are adjusted by industry medians. I estimate 
various configurations of the following model:  
FCF/Sales = f(Assets, MktBook, DivTA, TaxRate, Capex/Sales, Leverage,   
    Sales/Employee, TaxRatePre1987, MBO, Delist)     (4)  
If firms select positive NPV projects, capital expenditures should lead to higher future 
cash flows. I first test this relationship at the LBO in Model 1, and find that the coefficient for 
Capex/Sales is insignificant, an indication that management is investing funds in projects that do 
not increase firm value. If private period restructuring leads to wiser investment behavior, I 
expect a positive relationship FCF/Sales and Capex/Sales after the RLBO. To test this I include 
Capex/Sales a full year before the RLBO as an independent variable in Model 3. As per my 
prediction, the coefficient on this variable is positive and highly significant suggesting 
investments generate post-restructuring positive cash flows, which contrasts with the 
insignificant relationship pre-LBO. As security prices are based on discounted future cash flows, 
this provides additional evidence supporting the valuation results reported previously. 
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Public-to-private reverse leveraged buyouts are in essence second IPOs. Yet, we do not 
fully understand how they differ from first IPOs. If going private transactions brings greater 
alignment of interests between managers and shareholders, then private period decisions 
regarding investment policy should differ from first IPOs. One way to test this is to create a 
matched sample of controls based on size and industry. Following previous studies, firms whose 
initial public offering has occurred within the last five years are designated as IPOs (IPO), 
otherwise they are considered seasoned (Seas). In Model 4 I define interaction terms for each 
class of firms, and test for significant differences between groups using a chi-squared statistic. 31 
First, Capex/Sales(RLBO) is positive, highly significant, and qualitatively the same as 
reported in Model 3. While the coefficient for Capex/Sales(Seas) is comparable to that for 
RLBOs, Capex/Sales (IPO) is negative and highly significant. Joint hypothesis tests reject the 
null that the three interaction variables are equal. This finding implies that going private 
transactions combined with highly concentrated ownership results in disciplined managerial 
decision-making with resources put to more efficient uses compared to first IPOs. This also 
provides a potential explanation for IPO long-run return underperformance, as stock returns are 
impacted by market expectations for a firm’s future cash flows.32 
While long-term debt obligations are one approach to control excess funds, dividend 
payments are an alternative mechanism to return cash to shareholders. However, the evidence in 
Model 1 suggests that pre-LBO management is not taking advantage of either approach, as I find 
that coefficients for DivTA and Leverage are not statistically different from zero. In contrast, the 
evidence in Model 3 suggests that post-RLBO dividend policy disburses excess cash to 
shareholders as DivTA is negative and highly significant. 
                                                 
31 Interactions terms for control firms are designated RLBO-1 when the variable is one year earlier than FCF/Sales. 
32 The articles by Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) are examples. 
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If one outcome of restructuring is growth that leads to higher post-RLBO valuations, then 
a similar relationship should exist between growth and firm cash flows. As MktBook proxies for 
future investment opportunities, I include it as an explanatory variable in Models 1 and 3. While 
the coefficient does not differ statistically from zero in Model 1, it is positive and highly 
significant in Model 3. This provides additional evidence that restructuring that creates growth 
engenders higher post-RLBO valuations. 
The evidence so far indicates that tax benefits encourage LBOs. I test this further by 
including TaxRate in Model 1, and the coefficient is positive and significant at the 10 percent 
level. However, as marginal tax rates are reduced by TRA86, I interact a dummy variable that is 
set to one for the pre-1987 years with TaxRate (TaxRatePre1987). The coefficient is negative, 
larger in magnitude than for TaxRate, and highly significant. A test for equality between the two 
variables finds that they differ at the 1 percent level, which suggests that the higher marginal tax 
rates before TRA86 reduces free cash flow. This provides additional evidence that Bharath and 
Dittmar’s (2011) finding that free cash flow spurred leveraged buyout transactions only before 
1990 may actually be an artifact of higher marginal rates existing before TRA86. 
Finally, the variable log(Assets) is positive and significant in Models 1 and 3, implying 
that larger firms generate above industry free cash flow. While at the LBO, employee 
productivity (Sales/Employee) increases free cash flow, as the coefficient is significant at 5 
percent in Model 1. 
I test the robustness of my pre-LBO findings by again applying the Heckman (1978) 
procedure, where equation (2) is employed in a first step Probit regression. The results presented 
in Model 2 suggest that the conclusions from the first specification are not an artifact of 
endogeneity. Coefficients retain the same sign, magnitude, and comparable levels of statistical 
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significance. I also test whether my post-RLBO results are robust to self-selection by expanding 
the sample in Model 4, and coefficients retain the same sign and significance. I then perform the 
robustness check used on Table 2 on results reported in the regressions of Tables 7, and the 
coefficients are qualitatively similar to those reported previously. 
2.4.3.5. The Determinants of RLBO Long-run Independence 
Why do RLBO firms experience such a high attrition rate after they return to public 
trading? Similar to prior studies, over 30 percent of this sample is delisted within five years of 
the RLBO.33 Yet takeovers are not necessarily bad, as it is well documented that target 
shareholders earn substantial premiums at acquisition.34 However, the literature has yet to 
achieve consensus on explaining the high percentage of post-RLBO takeovers.  
If restructuring implements effective internal discipline, then external governance from the 
market for corporate control will not be necessary. The evidence so far suggests that effective 
restructuring requires a private period of sufficient duration. In order to determine if the private 
period impacts post-RLBO attrition, I group the sample by quartiles of time from LBO to RLBO. 
Consistent with this argument, firms in the quartile with the shortest private period have the 
highest attrition rate, while over 78 percent of the firms in quartile 2 are still publicly traded after 
five years. Yet there are also signs that takeover rate increases again at the longest private period 
durations. 
To gain additional insights into the motivations behind post-RLBO takeovers, Table 8 
presents several Logit regressions, where the dependent variable is set to one if a firm is publicly 
traded five years after the RLBO (SurviveFlag), otherwise it is zero. Explanatory variables test 
for relationships with growth opportunities, management discipline, capital structure, 
                                                 
33 See the studies by Kaplan (1991), Mian and Rosenfield (1993), and Holthausen and Larcker (1996). 
34 Healy, Palepu, and Rubak (1992) report takeover premiums earned by target shareholders. 
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profitability, taxes, and cost structure. All firm fundamentals are industry-adjusted. As long-term 
debt is still a major source of financing post-offering, I include TermPremium to account for the 
possible impact of interest rates. Several configurations of the following model are used in the 
analysis, where all variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Surviveflag = f(RLBOYears, RLBOYearsSq, MktBook, Leverage, ROA, DivTA,   
         PPETA, Sales/Employee, SG&A/Sales, Capex/Sales, R&D/Sales, LBO Count,  
             FCF/Sales, Assets, TermPremium)       (5)   
The results provide additional evidence on the role played by private period duration, as 
coefficients for RLBOYears are positive, large in magnitude, and significant in all specifications. 
At the same time, a quadratic term (RLBOYearsSq) is negative and significant in five 
regressions. A quadratic function suggests that the relationship between restructuring length and 
post-offering success is more complicated than previously thought for public-to-private RLBOs. 
I also note that hot LBO markets also play a role in post-RLBO status, as LBOCount is positive 
and significant in Model 6. 
I obtain additional evidence that restructuring which generates new growth leads to post-
RLBO success, as MktBook is positive and statistically significant in all models. In contrast, 
above industry employee productivity (Sales/Employee) increases the likelihood of delisting, 
where the coefficient in Model 5 is negative and significant at 5 percent. This implies that 
aggressive downsizing leading to excessive personnel reductions leaves the firm vulnerable to 
the market for corporate control post-RLBO. 
The results here provide additional support for the importance of taxes. Models 4 and 6 
include TaxRate as an independent variable, and the coefficient is positive, large in magnitude, 
and significant in both specifications. This suggests that five year independence is positively 
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correlated with taxes, where one possible explanation is that low marginal rates attract potential 
suitors in the takeover market. None of the other explanatory variables are significant at 
conventional levels. 
2.5. Conclusions 
This essay sheds light on private period restructuring undertaken by public-to-private 
RLBOs. The analysis examines profitability, valuation, financial and operating restructuring, and 
cost structure during the private period. In contrast to the prior literature which relies on 
comingled samples, I compile a comprehensive sample of public-to-private RLBOs for the 
period 1978 to 2006. Using only public-to-private transactions enables comparing firm 
fundamentals from before and after the private period to discern restructuring activities taking 
place. This analysis is supplemented with data obtained from the private period. 
The findings lead to several conclusions. First, free cash flow and capital expenditures are 
above industry pre-LBO, while growth options are at competitive levels. As these firms also 
have a below industry ownership concentration, this suggests that overinvestment exists. Second, 
increased leverage from the LBO leads to significant declines in free cash flow and capital 
expenditures during restructuring, while ownership concentration increases. These factors lead to 
reduced agency costs.  
Third, after the RLBO employee productivity, gross margin, free cash flow, and growth 
options increase as leverage decreases, while capital expenditures continue at industry norms.  
These findings imply that RLBOs retain the benefits of restructuring once they return to public 
ownership. 
Fourth, post-RLBO valuations are positively impacted by improved growth and reduced cost 
structure. While firm valuation benefits from concentrated ownership, equity values increase 
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with reduced overhead and increased investments in research and development. Overall, the 
evidence suggests that leveraged buyouts motivate management to act in the shareholder 
interests. 
Fifth, firms are subject to marginal tax rates before the LBO that are greater than industry 
while high levels of long-term debt post-LBO lead to dramatic reductions in income taxes post-
RLBO. 
Sixth, the findings show that the private period is negatively correlated with leverage, 
intangible assets, and employee productivity. The evidence suggests that firms spend less time 
restructuring when the term structure of interest rates is steep, and during active leveraged 
buyout markets. In contrast, firms that pay out excess cash as dividends remain private longer. 
Seventh, evidence helps explain the high post-RLBO attrition rate documented in the 
literature. Firms which develop new growth opportunities during restructuring have a higher 
probability of long-run independence post-RLBO, while a reverse relationship exists for 
excessive personnel reductions. I also find that active leveraged buyout markets and high 
marginal tax rates reduce post-RLBO takeover probability. Finally, the results suggest that the 
relationship between private period duration and the probability of remaining independent post-
RLBO is nonlinear. Robustness checks ensure that results are not impacted by endogeneity or 
impacted by outliers. 
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Chapter 3: Determinants of Long-run Stock Price Performance 
Following Reverse Leveraged Buyouts 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Re-emergence of a once public corporation back into the public arena is an important 
landmark in the life of that enterprise. Reverse leveraged buyouts (RLBOs) are such transactions 
by which companies re-emerge into public existence. Recently, RLBOs have received increased 
attention from researchers due to their significant growth as a percentage of the U.S. buyout 
industry. Given the fundamental nature of these transactions, namely going public, it is logical to 
draw comparisons between initial public offerings (IPOs) and RLBOs that are typically second 
or subsequent, IPOs.  
While a substantial body of research has accumulated on IPOs over the past few decades, 
in comparison, research on RLBOs still leaves much to be learned. Cao and Lerner (2009) 
document important facets of stock returns for highly levered first IPOs and equity carve outs, 
but not necessarily what I call pure RLBOs (namely, of firms that were once public), as their 
sample consists primarily of private-to-private and division-to-private RLBOs. The RLBO 
sample used in this analysis consists exclusively of public-to-private RLBOs that enables a 
unique opportunity to shed light on some intriguing, yet unaddressed, questions related to these 
increasingly important transactions. 
This study compares the performance of first IPOs with RLBOs, which are typically 
second IPOs. Motivated by some of the determinants of post-IPO stock price performance and 
some factors unique to RLBOs, I provide evidence on the determinants of post-RLBO stock 
price performance. What makes this study interesting is that some of these factors are 
idiosyncratic to RLBOs, such as, the difference in the degree of information asymmetry between 
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the first IPO and RLBO, the type of restructurings that are typically executed during the private 
period (the period between LBO and RLBO) leading to improvements in some key performance 
metrics, the duration of the private period, and the high levels of long-term debt at the offering. 
How do stock returns of public-to-private RLBOs perform relative to first IPOs and 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs)? Loughran and Ritter’s (1995) study shows that over a five 
year window IPOs and SEOs underperform relative to various benchmarks. On the surface, as 
RLBOs are second IPOs, it is reasonable to expect stock performance similar to results obtained 
by Loughran and Ritter (1995).  
However, the findings in Chapter 2 demonstrate that private period restructuring which 
engenders sales growth and reduces cost structure leads to superior equity valuations post-
RLBO. As stock value defines the market’s expectations, stock returns are the realization of 
those projections based on actual firm performance. Chapter 3 investigates whether private 
period restructuring leads to stock performance superior to that of first IPOs and seasoned firms 
within the same industry. 
When a firm offers stock to the public, the transaction is typically handled by an 
underwriter (investment banks such as J. P. Morgan and Credit Suisse handle these offerings) 
irrespective of whether it is an IPO, SEO, or RLBO. Prior research documents the certification 
role played by underwriters in IPOs, and shows that transactions handled by prestigious 
investment banks earn superior long-run stock returns.35 Even if RLBO stock returns typically 
outperform those of IPOs, underwriter prestige may still be important if the firm was previously 
exchange listed. I investigate the role of underwriter certification in the long-run returns of 
RLBO firms.  
                                                 
35 Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) examine the relationship between underwriter reputation and stock returns for 
IPOs. 
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The results in Chapter 2 demonstrate that equity values at the offering are related to 
changes in fundamentals from LBO to RLBO. Market efficiency suggests that as returns are the 
realization of expectations, these same variables should influence post-RLBO stock performance. 
Therefore, I investigate whether long-run stock returns are determined by changes taking place 
from LBO to RLBO. These results are then compared to the same variables in the post-RLBO 
years to determine which is more relevant to post-event stock performance. 
Several studies investigate how corporate governance determines post-IPO long-run 
stock returns. Examples in the literature include the role of venture capitalists, the composition of 
the board of directors, and ownership concentration (see Brav and Gompers, 1997, Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988, McConnell and Servaes, 1990, Klein, 1998, and Klein, 2002). Yet, 
research into the same governance variables for public-to-private RLBOs remains unexplored.  
While prior articles scrutinize various aspects of board composition and their impact on 
equity returns, research into board committees is rare. Yet much of the real work in any board is 
performed by the executive committee. The executive committee is particularly interesting due 
to its power, the fact that it is still unregulated, and the absence of prior research on it. I 
therefore, examine how the existence of this committee impacts post-RLBO stock returns.  
I find that public-to-private RLBOs earn superior long-run stock returns compared to 
IPOs, seasoned firms, or industry medians. However, when the benchmark is control firms 
matched on size and industry, abnormal returns are insignificant. This evidence suggests that 
superior stock performance is due to within industry firm characteristics such as size and growth 
opportunities. Little evidence is found of systemic market mispricing. Further, the positive 
abnormal returns peak at 36 months and wane thereafter. A battery of robustness checks ensures 
the validity of the results. 
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Second, sales growth from private period restructuring engenders positive stock returns 
after the RLBO. The growth in sales continues to be important post-RLBO. Improvements in 
sales during the two years after the RLBO lead to higher stock returns over the subsequent 24 
months. Further evidence on the benefits of private period restructuring is the significant 
relationship between improved return on assets and post-RLBO stock performance. Growth in 
ROA post-RLBO also continues to be important to stock returns in the future years. 
Third, restructuring disciplines managers to use firm resources for stockholder value 
creation, as increases in capital expenditures from LBO to RLBO lead to positive returns after 
the offering. The benefit of capital investments continues to bear fruit into the future years, as 
positive changes in capital expenditures during the 24 months after the RLBO lead to positive 
stock returns in the third and fourth year following the RLBO.  In contrast, I find that higher than 
industry capital expenditures at the RLBO lower future stock returns over the next three years. 
This suggests that equity markets respond positively to higher capital expenditures only when the 
firm capital expenditure was below the industry norm.  
Fourth, cost structure is important to stock returns after the RLBO. I find that a better 
than industry gross margin at the RLBO leads to higher stock returns over the next 12 months. 
Further, improvements in the same variable over the two-year period after the RLBO, lead to 
higher stock returns in years three and four. Lower overhead expenses at the RLBO have a 
similar beneficial effect on stock performance in the following year. 
Fifth, examining the role of corporate governance in post-RLBO stock price performance 
indicates that executive committees are a sign of entrenchment. Firms with corporate boards that 
include an executive committee earn negative abnormal returns in the first year after the RLBO. 
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Additional evidence of entrenchment is that ownership concentration exceeding the industry 
norm at the time of the RLBO leads to negative stock returns during the next 36 months. 
Sixth, while I find that RLBOs typically employ higher quality underwriters compared to 
IPOs, prestige investment banks still engender positive abnormal long-run stock returns. This 
relationship is robust to a variety of methodologies including buy-and-hold returns, the 
regressions of Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), and the Carhart (1997) four factor model. The 
evidence also suggests that positive abnormal returns accruing from underwriter selection peak 
during the first 36 months after the offering, and decline thereafter. 
3.2. Literature Background 
 
This section presents the extant literature relevant to RLBO stock performance, IPO 
returns, insider ownership, and board committees. I begin with studies investigating first day 
underpricing of RLBOs and IPOs. Next, research into the long-run underperformance of IPOs is 
discussed, followed by a review of comparable studies of RLBOs. The relationship between 
underwriter quality and IPO stock performance is the next topic, followed by a summary of the 
extant literature on ownership structure. I conclude with a discussion of board committees. 
Similar to RLBO studies using firm fundamentals, research into post-event stock 
performance uses samples that are largely private-to-private and division-to-private RLBOs. As 
these firms were not publicly traded before the LBO, their results cannot be generalized to the 
stock performance of public-to-private RLBOs. 
3.2.1. IPO and RLBO First Day Performance 
Rock’s (1986) model for IPO underpricing, is predicated on asymmetric information 
between the investors and insiders. Benveniste and Spindt (1989) also model the new issue 
process, and show that abnormal first day returns are compensation to investors for revealing 
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their level of interest in the offer during the marketing process. In a related study, Welch (1989) 
theorizes that underpricing of high-quality firms create signaling costs inducing low-quality 
firms to reveal their true status, and permits the former to obtain higher prices for seasoned 
offerings.  
Field and Sheehan (2004) study underpricing and its relationship to post-IPO ownership 
structure, and find that firms typically have outside blockholders at the offering, and that these 
holdings remain post-IPO. Field and Sheehan (2004) detect no relationship between underpricing 
and outside ownership, which conflicts with Booth and Chua’s (1996) findings that post-IPO 
firms have a dispersed ownership structure.  
The literature also includes several excellent surveys of IPO studies, including Ibbotson, 
Sindelar, and Ritter (1994), Ritter (1998), and Ritter and Welch (2002). Understanding abnormal 
first day returns is important due to an inverse relationship with long-run performance. 
Ainina and Mohan (1991) examine first day returns of RLBOs hypothesizing that there is 
less uncertainty, and thereby a lower market discount compared to IPOs. Their findings are 
consistent with this contention. Similarly, Hogan, Kish, and Olson (2001) observe a mean excess 
first day return of 7.64 percent, which is lower than that earned by original IPOs.  
3.2.2. IPO Long-Run Underperformance 
Ritter (1991) establishes that there is an inverse relationship between first day underpricing 
and long-run stock returns. Loughran and Ritter (1995) study long-run stock returns of both IPOs 
and SEOs, and detect similar trends in issuing activity. Further, their findings are consistent with 
Ritter (1991), as both IPOs and SEOs underperform against a matched set of control firms. They 
interpret these results as indicating that firms take advantage of windows of opportunity when 
issuing new equity. 
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The role of venture-backing in IPOs is the topic examined by Brav and Gompers (1997). 
Their results are show that venture capital leads to superior performance using an equal-weighted 
index, but value-weighting leads to similar returns across groups. The sensitivity of findings to 
the benchmark used is also raised by Ritter and Welch (2002) in their survey of the literature on 
IPO long-run underperformance in the U.S. 
The relationship between institutional ownership and post-IPO stock returns is investigated 
by Field and Lowry (2005), where they find that outside blockholders positively impact long-run 
stock returns. Field and Lowry’s (2005) findings suggest that in the months immediately after the 
IPO, institutions can consistently identify firms with superior stock returns, while at longer 
horizons their advantage lies in the ability to avoid poor performers.  As public-to-private 
RLBOs were previously listed, I expect less information asymmetry associated with RLBOs 
compared to IPOs. Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Patel (1997) examine initial-day and aftermarket 
price performance for debt IPOs. They argue that information asymmetry between investors and 
insiders is important in explaining the debt IPO price performance vis-à-vis that for equity IPOs. 
3.2.3. RLBO Long-term Stock Performance 
Do RLBOs suffer the same long-run underperformance that is characteristic of first 
IPOs?36 Mian and Rosenfield (1993) investigate post-RLBO three-year stock returns, and obtain 
positive and significant results. In a more recent study, Cao and Lerner (2009) examine long-run 
stock performance after the RLBO, and obtain results superior to IPOs. They also find that 
positive returns are concentrated in transactions clustered during 1981 to 1995. In a follow-up 
article, Cao’s (2011) results show that post-RLBO 36 month abnormal returns are negatively 
related to firm size, and positively related with buyout sponsor capital. By focusing on public-to-
                                                 
36 See Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995). 
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private RLBOs, I am able to investigate the role private period restructurings on future stock 
performance, and thereby extend previous work in the area. 
3.2.4. IPOs and Underwriter Reputation 
Carter and Manaster (1990) model the relationship between underwriter reputation and 
IPO underpricing, and similar to Rock (1986) they find that informed investor capital and IPO 
riskiness is positively related to first day returns. Their insight is that leaving money on the table 
is costly, which firms can avoid by signaling their quality to the market through underwriters 
with greater prestige. Empirical tests using a method they develop for rating underwriter prestige 
supports their predictions. Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) provide additional evidence supporting 
Carter and Manaster (1990), by testing three alternative measures of underwriter reputation with 
first day and long-run returns. Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) find that the Carter and Master 
(1990) method has a higher correlation with post-IPO stock performance than two other proxies, 
and a positive relationship exists with long-run returns. 
3.2.5. Insider Ownership 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) model the separation of ownership and control and the 
resulting impact on agency costs. Their study predicts that agency costs of equity (debt) increase 
(decrease) as insider ownership decreases, and by minimizing the sum of the two, determines an 
optimal capital structure. This article is particularly pertinent to RLBOs as Chapter 2 shows that 
long-term debt declines after the private period. If insider ownership also decreases post-RLBO, 
then Jensen and Meckling (1976) predict that the agency costs of equity will increase. 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) study the relationship between management ownership 
and market values using a piecewise linear specification. Their findings suggest that 
management ownership has an initial positive relationship with value, which then becomes 
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negative, and finally turns positive again. Their results suggest that Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976) convergence-of-interests dominates first, followed by entrenchment that declines once 
ownership exceeds 25 percent.  
McConnell and Servaes (1990) extend research into equity ownership and valuation using 
a nonlinear specification, and obtain a positive (negative) linear (quadratic) coefficient. Overall, 
their results are qualitatively similar to Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), where insider 
ownership determines firm value. Harjoto and Garen (2005) investigate this relationship for first 
IPOs and find that firm value declines with insider ownership.  
3.2.6. Board Committees 
Committees of the board of directors have received increased attention by regulators after 
a series of accounting scandals that led to the passage of SOX.37 The audit committee received 
the greatest scrutiny, with current exchange rules requiring at least three directors that are all 
independent. While regulators have devoted a great deal of time and attention to board 
committees, the same is not true for finance researchers.  
In the two studies to investigate committees, Klein (1998) finds no evidence that firm 
performance is positively correlated with a completely independent audit committee. In contrast, 
Klein’s (2002) study did find evidence that audit committees where a majority of directors are 
independent have significantly less abnormal accruals. However, it is important to note that the 
one powerful committee receiving no attention from either regulators or financial economists is 
the executive committee. 
3.3. Testable Hypotheses 
 
While there is a large literature on the long-run stock performance of IPOs, we have only 
begun to increase our understanding of reverse leveraged buyouts. As those studies concentrate 
                                                 
37 The two best known examples are Enron and Worldcom, which occurred in 2001. 
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on private-to-private and division-to-private transactions, a gap in the literature exists on the 
differences between public-to-private RLBOs and IPOs. 
One characteristic that distinguishes RLBOs from IPOs is their high leverage at the 
offering. Cao and Lerner (2009) report a post-RLBO mean debt-to-assets of 30.7 percent. In 
addition, I find that public-to-private RLBOs are even more highly levered with a mean debt-to-
assets of 41.8 percent. 
Another distinguishing trait of RLBOs is their size. A comparison of studies on IPOs with 
my findings shows that RLBOs are composed of more assets and employ more people post-
offering. Last but not the least, since public-to-private RLBOs were previously listed, they are 
more mature and subject to less information asymmetry than IPOs. These differences suggest 
that findings for IPOs and other RLBOs cannot be generalized to public-to-private transactions. 
As discussed earlier, IPO stock returns are characterized by initial underpricing followed 
by long-run underperformance.38 Ritter (1991) establishes that there is an inverse relationship 
between first day underpricing and long-run stock returns. Cao and Lerner (2009) find that 
underpricing exists for both RLBOs and IPOs, as they report first-day RLBO returns of 12.9 
percent compared to 22.2 percent for IPOs. They also show that 36 and 60 month returns for 
their sample of private-to-private and division-to-private RLBOs are superior to those obtained 
for IPOs. 
However, the RLBOs in their sample are not publicly traded before the LBO. In contrast, 
public-to-private RLBOs are in effect second IPOs, and were once publicly traded. I argue that 
one outcome of public-to-private RLBOs is lower information asymmetry between issuers and 
outsiders. Hence, I expect less underpricing (or more accurate valuation) of RLBOs vis-à-vis 
IPOs.  This leads me to propose the following:  
                                                 
38 See Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter (1994), Brav and Gompers (1997), and Ritter (1998) 
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H1: Long-run stock price performance of RLBOs in the aftermarket will be superior 
to that of IPOs.  
The results presented in Chapter 2 demonstrate that private period restructuring that 
accelerates growth leads to superior valuations at the RLBO. However, equity values represent 
market estimations of the discounted value of future cash flows, which are made up of capital 
gains and dividends. Stock returns represent the realization of these expectations in the form of 
dividends paid and actual price changes. If equity markets are efficient, then those private period 
factors that determine valuation at the RLBO should be as important to stock returns after the 
offering. 
The analysis in Chapter 2 suggests that improved future growth opportunities will 
contribute to superior stock performance following the RLBO. These growth options manifest 
themselves as increased future cash flows and positive long-run returns. If restructuring that 
improves future investment opportunities is the key to success, then post-RLBO sales growth 
should also be correlated to stock performance in the ensuing years. 
At the same time, Chapter 2 findings show that firm fundamentals at the RLBO are 
important to current valuations. Higher gross margins and lower overhead expenses engender 
superior valuations. Market efficiency implies that the relationship between firm fundamentals at 
the RLBO and realized stock returns will be similar. These arguments lead to the following 
hypotheses: 
H2A: Sales improvement during the private period and after the offering is 
positively related to future long-run RLBO stock returns.  
H2B: Reduction in the cost structure during the private period and after the offering 
engenders superior post-RLBO stock performance. 
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Studies by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) show 
that insider ownership that entrenches management reduces firm value. However, entrenchment 
can occur for various reasons. One governance mechanism designed to oversee management and 
protect outside shareholders is the board of directors. Subversion of the oversight function of the 
board by insiders will result in entrenchment and value destructing behavior. Prior studies have 
investigated various ways that insiders can compromise the governance responsibility of the 
board of directors. Those articles examined various aspects of board composition including 
classification, the CEO serving as chair (CEO duality), and the number of directors.39 
In contrast, the relationship between board committees and entrenchment has received 
limited attention from finance researchers in spite of increased scrutiny by regulators and the 
exchanges. This enhanced oversight has manifested itself in rules concerning the size and 
independence of the audit, compensation, and nominating committees. Yet, little attention has 
been paid to the executive committee in spite of the important role it plays. As a result, it remains 
untouched by the post-SOX regulations impacting other board functions. The role of the 
executive committee can best be illustrated by the quote below from the Bucyrus International 
2005 proxy statement.40 
“The Company's Executive Committee is comprised of Messrs. Chu (Chairman), 
Weidman and Jenkins. The Executive Committee is responsible for exercising all of the powers 
of the Board of Directors during intervals between meetings, except for those powers delegated 
to other committees of the Board of Directors and powers that may not be delegated to a 
committee of the Board of Directors under Delaware law.” 
 
In examining the function of the executive committee, it provides an avenue by which 
firm insiders can subvert board functions between meetings and operate outside of the 
                                                 
39 Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) are examples of investigations into board size, while Brickley, Coles, and 
Jarrell (1997) study CEO duality. Board classification is the focus to Faleye’s (2007) study.. 
40 A good example illustrating the operation of the executive committee is found in the 2010 Wal-Mart proxy 
statement. In this case, the executive committee acted 16 times by written unanimous consent in fiscal 2009. 
Additionally, a review of committee members shows it is comprised exclusively of firm insiders. 
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mechanisms intended to protect the shareholders. As such, executive committees enhance the 
inherent conflicts of interest that exist between firm stakeholders. If executive committees 
protect firm insiders at the expense of outside shareholders, I argue that an efficient market will 
impound its existence into equity prices. The above arguments lead me to propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: Long-run stock price performance of RLBO firms that have a board executive 
committee will be inferior to those RLBO firms that do not.  
Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), show that underwriter quality is negatively related to 
underpricing and positively associated with long-run stock performance. Both Carter and 
Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) argue that investment banks fulfill a 
certification role, where investors view offerings as superior when they are sponsored by more 
reputable underwriters. Based on previous research on the importance of underwriter 
certification on post-IPO stock price performance, I propose the following hypothesis for post-
RLBO stock price performance:  
H4: Underwriter quality is positively related to post-offering long-run stock returns 
of public-to-private RLBOs. 
3.4. Sample Construction Process and Data Sources 
3.4.1. Data Sources 
While the sample of RLBOs is drawn from the 208 firms used in Chapter 2, additional data 
is required to test the hypotheses of this section. The Securities Data Company’s (SDC) New 
Issues database provides information on the offering, including primary shares, secondary shares, 
and underwriters. Underwriter rankings and firm ages are obtained from Jay Ritter’s website.41  
                                                 
41 http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm 
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The first annual proxy statement (Form DEF14A) submitted after the private period to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is examined to obtain the required governance data. 
This information includes shares outstanding, ownership structure, board composition and 
committees, CEO tenure, and those firms claiming the “controlled firm exemption”. 
Since the sample spans the years 1978 to 2006, one resource is not sufficient to obtain the 
required forms. First, I use the Security and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR system and the 
Mergent Online database to obtain proxy statements from 1996 to 2006. Next, three sources are 
used to obtain the remaining filings not available in EDGAR. Lexis/Nexis and Thompson 
Research contain proxy statements back to 1986. Filings not available online are then obtained 
through microfiche maintained by Q-Data Corp.  
In one instance a firm is delisted so soon after the RLBO (Spectramed, Inc.) that a proxy 
statement is never submitted to the SEC. Therefore, the final sample size for tests conducted in 
Chapter 3 is 207 firms. Further, in some instances information not available in proxy statements 
is obtained from the annual 10-K filing, the prospectus, or the S-1 registration statement. Firm 
fundamentals are those used in Chapter 2, while equity returns are obtained from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) monthly files. 
Five benchmarks are used to compute abnormal stock returns. First, a list of IPOs from 
1978 to 2006 is obtained from Jay Ritter’s website after excluding RLBOs from this sample as 
well as those used in Cao and Lerner (2009). I then calculate industry median monthly returns. 
Next, I compile a set of industry returns for seasoned firms based on the 2-digit SIC code by 
excluding RLBOs and IPOs from the CRSP monthly file.42 Industry medians based on 2-digit 
SIC code are also computed using the combined IPO and seasoned firm lists. 
                                                 
42 IPO returns are computed from non-RLBO firms within five years of a public offering. 
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Fourth, I create a sample of control firms using a selection procedure that minimizes the 
absolute difference between the assets of RLBOs and candidate control firms within the same 2-
digit SIC code, and with proxy data available. If a match cannot be found from the initial 
candidates, the steps are repeated using a 1-digit SIC code. Using this process I obtain matches 
for the entire sample. Finally, abnormal returns are computed using the CRSP value-weighted 
index in testing underwriter certification.43  
I then examine both sets of annual proxies and construct a subsample with more than one 
class of stock, and at least one has preferential voting rights owned exclusively by insiders.44 
Ownership percentages are calculated based on control and cash flow rights for both RLBOs and 
the matching firms.  
Ownership percentages are hand calculated following the procedures recommended by 
Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006), which reduces the likelihood of the errors 
found in the Compact Disclosure database. As an example, if private equity firms have multiple 
board representatives, each director often beneficially owns redundant shares. I scrutinize the 
footnotes to avoid redundantly counting the same shares. The results using the cash flow 
percentages are qualitatively the same as those for the control shares and are not reported for 
conciseness. Appendix B contains a list of all databases used in the empirical work of Chapter 3. 
3.5. Methodology 
3.5.1. Long-run Stock Returns 
Barber and Lyon (1997) recommend using buy-and-hold returns over cumulative abnormal 
returns at longer horizons. However, follow-up research has raised concerns over test statistics 
based on their approach. Cowan and Sergeant (2001) shows that buy-and-hold returns are highly 
                                                 
43 This provides comparability with results reported by Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998). 
44 A typical example is where one share of privileged equity has voting rights equivalent to five shares of publicly 
traded stock. 
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non-normal due to skewness and kurtosis that increases with the time horizon.45 Their empirical 
tests suggest that both are ameliorated by winsorizing at the third standard deviation, and I 
follow that process in this analysis. 
A second concern with buy-and-hold returns is that they are constructed in event time, and 
suffer from cross-sectional correlation. This occurs due to market forces impacting all stocks at 
the same time, where the number of firms with overlapping months increases with the horizon. 
Test statistics that do no control for this issue may result in incorrect inferences. Cowan and 
Sergeant (2001) recommend using test statistics based on unpaired group differences to reduce 
the impact of cross-sectional correlation. One advantage to their approach is that it can be 
applied to medians as well as means. Therefore, I report both paired and unpaired statistics 
employing both means and medians.  
An alternative approach to cross-sectional correlation is to employ a calendar time 
methodology. As a robustness check, I follow Brav and Gompers (1997) and compute mean 
calendar month returns for the RLBOs, the benchmarks, and the difference between the two. 
This typically creates a file of 270 time series observations, with each record containing the 
average returns for that date, which I input into a Carhart (1997) four factor model.46 The sign 
and significance of the intercept indicates whether there are abnormal returns. 
3.5.2. Univariate Tests 
In examining stock returns by category such as underwriter rankings, sample firms are 
grouped by the critical values of the focus variables. I test for significant differences across 
group means (medians) using t-statistics (the Wilcoxon signed rank test). When employing the 
                                                 
45 Buy-and-hold returns computed for both RLBOs and control firms have a skewness and kurtosis that is 
qualitatively similar to those found by Cowan and Sergeant (2001). 
46 Brav and Gompers (1997) used the Fama and French (1993) three factor model. 
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Carhart (1997) approach, the dependent variable is the difference in mean monthly returns 
between the groups.  
3.5.3 Multivariate Tests 
Multivariate tests of underwriter certification duplicate the regressions of Carter, Dark, and 
Singh (1998) using a value-weighted index. Following Barber and Lyon (1997), I also compute 
abnormal returns using control firms, IPO medians, seasoned firm medians, and industry 
medians. As the cross-sectional variation of RLBO underwriter rankings is lower than for IPOs, 
the focus variable is a dummy set to one if the Carter and Manaster (1990) value is at least 9.0.  
Regressions test for the determinants of industry-adjusted buy-and-hold returns at 12 and 
36 month intervals. One set of regressions employ fundamentals at the RLBO. Additional 
specifications investigate changes in fundamentals from LBO to RLBO and from RLBO to two 
years later.  
3.6. Results 
3.6.1. Long-run Stock Returns of RLBO Firms 
3.6.1.1. Long-run Buy-and-hold Stock Returns of RLBO Firms 
Table 9 presents the long-run stock returns of public-to-private RLBOs. Panel A 
summarizes buy-and-hold returns for 12, 36, and 60 months, while Panel B reports an analysis 
over 13 to 36, 37 to 60, and 13 to 60 months. Results using Carhart’s (1997) model based on 
calendar time returns are reported in Panels C and D. In each panel, the first row reports raw 
unadjusted returns (Raw Returns). Subsequent rows test returns adjusted by IPO medians (IPO 
Adjusted), seasoned firm medians (Seasoned Firm Adjusted), industry medians (Industry-
Adjusted), and control firms (Control Firm Adjusted).47, 48  
                                                 
47 Seasoned industry results are calculated using the 2-digit SIC code medians. 
48 Firms are selected based on 2-digit SIC codes where possible, otherwise by using 1-digit SIC codes 
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Mean and medians are reported along with tests of significance based on parametric t-
statistics and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank test. Test statistics in parentheses are computed using 
firm level paired means and medians, while unpaired group differences between RLBOs and the 
benchmarks are reported in brackets. The analysis focuses on medians in order to ameliorate the 
impact of outliers. 
In Panel A of Table 9, raw cumulative long-run stock returns are positive and statistically 
significant at better than 1 percent at all horizons. Panel B results show that returns are positive 
and highly significant from 13 to 36 months. Yet, the evidence indicates that stock performance 
declines over the last 24 months, as median returns during months 37 to 60 are not statistically 
different from zero. This suggests that RLBOs suffer declining stock performance approximately 
three years after the returning to public trading.  
The evidence in Table 9 supports Hypothesis H1, as IPO Adjusted returns are positive, 
economically substantive, and highly significant at all horizons using both paired and unpaired 
statistics. Similar to Raw Returns, there is evidence of a decline from 37 to 60 months.  
Next, I compute Seasoned Firm Adjusted returns, and the results in Panel A are positive 
and significant at better than 1 percent at all horizons. As before, a pattern of declining stock 
performance over 37 to 60 months is observed. I also note that Industry-Adjusted returns are 
qualitatively the same as when they are Seasoned Firm Adjusted. Overall, contrary to the 
findings for IPOs, stocks for public-to-private RLBOs outperform their industry counterparts. 
Finally, I report in Panel A that Control Firm Adjusted cumulative returns are small in 
magnitude and not statistically different from zero irrespective of the horizon. Additionally, the 
13 to 36 month returns in Panel B are insignificant, while those over the last 24 months are 
negative and significant at the 5 percent level. Overall, I find little evidence that RLBO stock 
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returns suffer from market mispricing. Instead, these results in combination with those of 
Chapter 2 imply that after restructuring, above industry characteristics such a growth options and 
size lead to superior stock performance. These results support Hypothesis H1. Figure 5 shows 
buy-and-hold stock returns of each class of firms. 
3.6.1.2. Cross-sectional Correlation of Buy-and-Hold Stock Returns 
As the returns reported previously are calculated in event time, they may be affected by 
cross-sectional correlation. As a robustness check, following Brav and Gomper’s (1997) calendar 
time approach I employ Carhart’s (1997) model as follows: 
rt = f(αt, RMRFt, SMBt, HMLt, MOMt)      (6) 
The dependent variable is the mean monthly return less the risk-free rate of interest.49 As 
in Panels A and B of Table 9, unadjusted and four sets of adjusted returns are reported in Panels 
C and D. Using this approach abnormal returns are measured by the sign and significance of the 
intercept (α). Panel C reports returns over 12, 36, and 60 month intervals, while Panel D 
summarizes intercepts for 13 to 36, 37 to 60, and 13 to 60 months. As the intercepts represent a 
monthly return, I report compounded returns in curly braces to provide comparability with the 
findings in Panels A and B. 
First, intercepts for Raw Returns are insignificant irrespective of horizon, suggesting that 
once known market factors are controlled for RLBO returns are not the result of mispricing. 
However, when returns are IPO Adjusted, intercepts are significantly positive in all cases. 
Compounding obtains magnitudes qualitatively similar to the buy-and-hold returns reported 
earlier. This suggests that the results reported in Panels A and B do not suffer from cross-
sectional correlation.  
                                                 
49 The risk-free rate and the market factors are obtained from Wharton Research Data Services. 
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Seasoned Firm Adjusted calendar time returns are reported next, which demonstrate a 
pattern similar to those in event time, where regression intercepts are positive and highly 
significant at 12, 36, and 60 months. Yet, the magnitudes are smaller than those found for IPOs. 
The pattern of declining performance from 37 to 60 is again detected, where regression 
intercepts are not significant at conventional levels. The findings using Industry-adjusted returns 
are qualitatively the same as those found for Seasoned Firm Adjusted returns. Overall, the 
Carhart (1997) results reinforce the previous tests that RLBOs outperform firms in the same 
industry for the first 36 months after the offering. Stock returns more closely resemble industry 
norms beginning approximately three years post-RLBO. 
The last row of Panel C reports Carhart (1997) Control Firm Adjusted intercepts, which 
are small and insignificant at all horizons, and qualitatively similar to those reported in Panel A. 
Intercepts in Panel D do not differ statistically from zero, which contrasts with the negative and 
significant findings at 37 to 60 months reported in Panel B. In summary, the results of this 
analysis support Hypothesis H1, as RLBO stock returns outperform those of IPOs in the same 
industry, but with little evidence that stock prices deviate from fundamental value. 
3.6.2. Corporate Governance of RLBO Firms 
If private period restructuring is effective in minimizing agency issues, then post-RLBO 
corporate governance should protect the interests of outside shareholders. Table 10 reports 
summary statistics of corporate governance measures for both RLBOs and matching control 
firms. Paired differences in means (medians) are tested using t-statistics (z-statistics). The 
59 
 
analysis focuses on post-RLBO differences, as changes in governance practices and regulations 
over time could confound an analysis of pre-LBO compared to post-RLBO.50 
RLBOs have a highly concentrated ownership, where officers and directors own on 
average 47 percent (median of 51 percent), compared to a mean of 24 percent (median of 12 
percent) for the controls. The two groups differ statistically at the 1 percent level using both tests. 
Private equity ownership is the primary reason as these firms average a 33 percent stake post-
RLBO.51 In contrast, I find insignificant differences between CEO ownership of RLBOs and the 
matching controls. Finally, stock held by outside blockholders differs between RLBOs and the 
control firms, where RLBOs average less than 10 percent (median of 5.5 percent) ownership, 
compared to 13 percent (median of 9 percent) for matching control firms. The differences are 
highly significant in both mean and median tests. 
Private equity board representation is likely responsible for substantive differences in the 
types of directors. I find that a mean (median) 34 (33) percent of directors are classified as 
outside independent for RLBO firms, compared to 61 (63) percent for the controls. The 
differences are significant at better than 1 percent. At the same time, board domination by private 
equity firms results in an average of 39 percent grey directors, which compares to 13 percent for 
the benchmarks, and the differences are highly significant using t-statistics and z-statistics. 
RLBO boards are smaller than their controls by one member on average, and the results using 
medians are qualitatively the same. In both cases the differences are highly significant. 
RLBOs average over one less board meeting a year than their peers, and the differences 
are highly significant using means and medians. I find additional differences in governance for 
                                                 
50 One example is a classified board, where in unreported results I find that the percentage of firms using staggered 
elections increases significantly from before the LBO to after the RLBO. However, the difference between the 
RLBOs and a matching set of controls does not differ statistically from zero. 
51 In unreported results, private equity firms also represent mean (median) of 31 (33) percent of board members. 
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those RLBOs where Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s (2003) G-Index, and Bebchuk, Cohen, and 
Farrell’s (2009) E-Index can be calculated. The results show that RLBOs are more “democratic” 
and less entrenched than their controls, and the differences are highly significant. The other 
governance variables exhibit insignificant differences between RLBOs and the control firms.   
Table 10 results show that RLBO firms typically emerge from restructuring with a 
different CEO than in the pre-LBO years. Mean (median) CEO tenure is 4.3 (3.0) years for 
RLBO firms and 8.4 (6.0) years for the controls, and the differences are highly significant 
employing t/z-statistics. As it was reported in Chapter 2 that the median private period duration 
is 4.5 years, this suggests that over one-half of the CEOs were not on the job at the LBO. 
RLBO firms also maintain less board committees than their competition, where the 
differences are significant at better than 1 percent. In examining which committees exist, it is 
apparent that the primary difference is that few RLBOs have a nominating committee. While 
only 28 percent of RLBOs maintain this committee, matching firms have over a 49 percent 
occurrence. Both means and medians differ statistically from zero at the 1 percent level. 
Pearson correlations indicate that private equity ownership is strongly related to insider 
shareholdings (the Pearson correlation is 0.679).52 Even more noteworthy is the strong inverse 
relationship (the Pearson correlation is -0.361) between ownership by blockholders and private 
equity. I contend that even if private equity ownership has a beneficial relationship with stock 
returns, the positive impact is likely offset by correspondingly less oversight by institutional 
investors. 
3.6.3. Linking Private Period Restructuring to Post-RLBO Stock Returns 
Table 11 reports regressions relating industry-adjusted buy-and-hold returns after the 
RLBO to changes in firm fundamentals during the private period. The salient explanatory factors 
                                                 
52 Not reported for brevity. 
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are sales growth (Growth), change in profitability (∆ROA), changes in cost structure variables 
(∆R&D/Sales and ∆SG&A/Sales) and change in capital expenditures (∆Capex/Sales). I also 
include change in shares per owner (∆Shares/Owner) to capture the effect of ownership 
concentration on stock performance. All firm fundamentals are adjusted by industry medians.  
I include the following control variables: book value of assets (Assets), leverage 
(Leverage), tangible assets (PPETA), private period length (RLBOYears), a delisting dummy 
(Delist), and a variable proxying for the term structure of interest rates (TermPremium). All firm 
fundamentals are adjusted by industry medians. Panel A of Table 11 uses buy-and-hold returns 
over a 12 month horizon as the dependent variable, while 36 month returns are employed in 
Panel B.  I use the following regression specification: 
BHRt = f(Assets, Leverage, PPETA, Growth, ∆R&D/Sales,      
∆Shares/Owner, ∆SG&A/Sales, ∆ROA, RLBOYears, Delist,          
    ∆Capex/Sales, TermPremium)       (7) 
The focus explanatory variable is sales growth from LBO to RLBO (Growth), and I 
obtain a positive coefficient in Panel A, Model 1 that is highly significant. Profitability 
improvements from restructuring also benefit stock returns after the RLBO, as the variable 
∆ROA is positive and significant at the 5 percent level in Models 2 and 3. Increases in capital 
expenditures lead to higher stock returns over the first twelve months after the RLBO, as the 
coefficient for ∆Capex/Sales in Model 3 is positive and significant at the 5 percent level.  
Regressions using 36 month returns are reported in Panel B of Table 11. The coefficient 
for Growth in Model 1 is positive and highly significant. Profitability improvements during the 
private period lead to positive abnormal stock returns over a 36 month horizon.  The coefficients 
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for ∆ROA are positive and significant at the 5 percent level in Models 2 and 3. ∆Capex/Sales also 
emerges as positive and statistically different from zero at the 5 percent level in Model 3.  
Although I control for the length of the private period, due to the possibility that the 
results may be affected by the duration of the restructuring, I check for robustness of the results 
in Table 11 by re-estimating the regressions using yearly averages for firm fundamentals and for 
36 month buy-and-hold returns. I obtain qualitatively similar results. The results in Table 11 are 
also robust to using raw unadjusted buy-and-hold returns. Finally, the conclusions continue to 
hold after excluding firms de-listed due to bankruptcy or insufficient capital,  
Overall, the evidence supports Hypothesis H2A by showing that sales growth during the 
private period leads to positive long-run returns following the RLBO. Similarly, profitability 
measured by ∆ROA and ∆Capex/Sales during the private period restructuring are also strong 
positive determinants of post-RLBO stock price performance.  
3.6.4. Linking Firm Characteristics at the RLBO to Long-run Stock Returns 
In this section I examine how salient firm fundamentals at the time of the RLBO 
determine post-RLBO stock price performance. The results of the analysis are reported in Table 
12. Panel A presents findings using 12 month returns, while results in Panel B are over a 36 
month horizon. The relevant explanatory variables are sales growth (Growth), sales productivity 
(Sales/Employee), cost structure variables (COGSSl and SG&A/Sales), research and development 
(R&D/Sales), capital expenditures (Capex/Sales), dual class stocks (DualClass), board 
committees (TotComm), and executive committees (ExecComm). I also include shares per owner 
(Shares/Owner) to capture the effect of ownership concentration on stock performance.  
I include the following control variables: book value of assets (Assets), leverage 
(Leverage), tangible assets (PPETA), private period length (RLBOYears), a delisting dummy 
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(Delist), ownership of outside blockholders (Block), and a variable proxying for the term 
structure of interest rates (TermPremium). Panel A of Table 12 uses buy-and-hold returns over a 
12 month horizon as the dependent variable, while 36 month returns are employed in Panel B. 
Several configurations of the following model are estimated: 
BHRt = f(Assets, Leverage, PPETA, Growth, COGSSl, R&D/Sales    
Shares/Owner, SG&A/Sales, EBITDA/Sales, RLBOYears, Sales/Employee,    
Capex/Sales, DivTA, CashTA, MktBook, Delist, TermPremium,    
      ExecComm, DualClass, TotComm, Block)     (8) 
I find that gross margin is a significant determinant of post-RLBO stock returns, as the 
coefficient for COGSSl in Model 2 is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. I find that 
overhead is inversely related to stock performance as the coefficient for SG&A/Sales is negative 
and highly significant. In Models 3 and 4 I include employee productivity, Sales/Employee, 
which is positive and differs statistically from zero at the 5 percent level. 
Cost structure is one component of returns on invested capital. In Panel B, I include ROA 
in Model 2 to test for a relationship with 36 month returns, and the coefficient is positive and 
significant at the 5 percent level. The importance of overhead in determining post-RLBO stock 
returns wanes after 12 months, as the coefficient for ∆SG&A/Sales is insignificant.53 In 
conclusion, findings presented in Table 12 provide evidence in support of Hypothesis H2B, as 
cost structure at the RLBO is a significant determinant of post-RLBO stock returns. 
I find that the coefficient for ExecComm is negative and highly significant in Model 1 of 
Table 12 (Panel A). This is in support of Hypothesis H3, as the existence of executive committee 
of the board is a sign of entrenchment. In contrast, the number of committees on the board 
(TotComm), and whether the firm has more than one class of stock (DualClass) are insignificant. 
                                                 
53 The model is not reported for conciseness. 
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Above industry capital expenditures at the RLBO have a negative effect on future stock 
returns, as coefficients for Capex/Sales in Model 3 of Panels A and B are significantly negative. 
In contrast, equity markets value investment in research and development post-RLBO, as 
R&D/Sales is positive and significant in Models 3 and 4. MktBook in Model 5 of Panel A, is 
positive and highly significant. Overall, this suggests that higher growth opportunities at the 
RLBO lead to positive stock returns over the next 12 months. Finally, the evidence in Panel B 
suggests that above industry ownership concentration is a sign of entrenchment, as coefficients 
for Shares/Owner in Models 1 and 2 are significantly negative.  
To check the robustness of the results I re-estimate the regressions in Panel A, Model 1 
by substituting other traditional board composition variables for TotComm and DualClass.54 The 
coefficient for ExecComm is consistently negative and significant, while the other board 
variables are insignificant. I run a diagnostic check for multicollinearity to verify that the results 
are not affected by correlation with other determinants of stock returns.  
The results in Table 12 continue to hold when using unadjusted stock returns. The 
findings are also robust to the exclusion of firms that are delisted for financial distress. In 
summary, the findings reported in Table 12 are robust and support hypotheses H2B and H3. 
Equity markets react favorably to better than industry margins, overhead, and returns at the 
RLBO, and the absence of an executive committee. 
3.6.5. Post-RLBO Changes in Firm Fundamentals and Long-run Stock Returns 
The trends reported in Figures 1 to 4 suggest that the benefits of private period 
restructuring continue into the future years. If that is so, then the variables in equation (7) that are 
relevant should continue to be significant in the post-RLBO years. To test this, I compute 
                                                 
54 The board variables include size, meeting frequency, classification, CEO duality, and independent directors. 
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changes in firm fundamentals over the first two years after the RLBO to relate to the buy-and-
hold stock returns for the third through fourth years.  
Table 13 presents regressions using equation (9) below to examine how changes in firm 
fundamentals after the RLBO determine future stock performance. The relevant variables are 
sales growth (Growth), change in profitability (∆ROA), changes in cost structure variables 
(∆COGSSls and ∆SG&A/Sales), change in employee productivity (∆Sales/Employee), and 
change in capital expenditures (∆Capex/Sales). I also test the impact of changes in ownership 
concentration (∆Shares/Owner). 
I include as control variables the book value of assets (Assets), leverage (Leverage), 
tangible assets (PPETA), private period length (RLBOYears), a delisting dummy (Delist), and a 
variable proxying for the term structure of interest rates (TermPremium). Several configurations 
of the following model are estimated: 
BHRt = f(Assets, Leverage, PPETA, Growth, ∆Sales/Employee,     
∆Shares/Owner, ∆SG&A/Sales, ∆COGSSls, ∆ROA, RLBOYears,         
      ∆Capex/Sales, Delist, TermPremium)      (11) 
The focus variable is Growth, as the evidence so far suggests that restructuring that 
creates growth leads to positive stock returns after the RLBO. In this analysis I test whether that 
relationship continues over the next four years by including Growth in Model 2, and obtain a 
positive coefficient that is significant at the 5 percent level. This finding implies that if firms 
maintain the changes implemented during the private period into the post-RLBO years, they 
continue to improve long-run stock performance.  
I include ∆COGSSl as an explanatory variable in Model 2 of Table 13. This variable is 
negative and significant at the 1 percent level. The change in return on assets (∆ROA) is included 
66 
 
in Models 3 and 4, and the coefficient is positive and highly significant. The fact that improving 
gross margin and return on assets determines future stock returns suggests that cost structure 
continues to be important well beyond the RLBO. In contrast, the insignificant coefficient for 
∆SG&A/Sales suggests that reductions in overhead costs are not important for future stock price 
performance. 
∆Capex/Sales is included in Model 3 and is significantly positive. Overall, the evidence 
suggests that sales growth and cost structure improvement in the post-RLBO period continue to 
be major determinants of post-RLBO stock returns. 
Finally, the coefficient for private period length is negative and significant at the 10 
percent level. I contend that limiting the sample to public-to-private RLBOs shows that the 
relationship between the length of the private period and post-RLBO stock performance is more 
complicated than the business media advice to avoid the “quick flip”. In fact these findings 
suggest that extremely long private periods more closely resemble a first IPO. Again, the 
findings in Table 13 are robust to the use of unadjusted returns and to the exclusion of firms 
delisted for bankruptcy. 
3.6.6. Underwriter Reputation and Long Run Returns of RLBO Firms 
The extant literature finds that underwriter reputation is positively related to IPO stock 
returns.55 However, prior research has yet to determine whether a similar relationship exists for 
RLBOs. As RLBO firms were once publicly traded, these firms are expected to be associated 
with less information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors as compared to IPO 
firms. Therefore, while I expect to find a positive coefficient for underwriter reputation, the 
magnitude of the impact on stock returns is likely to be less for RLBOs as compared to that for 
IPOs. 
                                                 
55 See Carter and Manaster (1990) and Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998). 
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The work of Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), shows that the modified Carter-Manaster 
(CM) system provides the strongest relationship between underwriter reputation and stock 
returns. CM rankings are based on the listing position of underwriter names in the “tombstone” 
announcements of stock offerings, and based on their work I adopt the CM system for this 
analysis. I obtain the updated rankings from Professor Jay Ritter’s website.56  
Table 14 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in this analysis, where Panel 
A duplicates Table II of Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) for RLBOs. Firm betas (Beta) and stock 
return standard deviations (StdDevRet), are computed using the CRSP daily file for offer date +6 
through offer date +260. Size is the gross proceeds from the offering, and is also restated to the 
year 2000 (Inflation Adjusted Size) using the consumer price index.57 Similar to underwriter 
rankings, firm ages (Age) are obtained from Professor Jay Ritter’s website, while the percentage 
of secondary shares in the offering (Second) is extracted from the Securities Data Company’s 
New Issues database.  
The mean (median) Beta for RLBO firms is 0.958 (0.891), not surprisingly, is less than 
for the IPOs of Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) sample. I obtain qualitatively similar results for 
StdDevRet, where RLBOs have a mean (median) StdDevRet of 0.031 (0.029) compared to the 
0.034 (0.031) reported for IPOs.  
The most distinguishing characteristic of RLBOs are their high underwriter rankings, 
where the mean (median) CM is 8.600 (9.001), which contrast with those for IPOs of 6.97 (8.00). 
In Panel B, I report firm counts by CM score, and over 50 percent of the sample have the highest 
ranking of 9.001. 
 
                                                 
56 http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm 
57 The consumer price index is obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website http://www.bls.gov 
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3.6.6.1. Underwriter Reputation and Buy-and-hold Stock Returns of RLBO Firms 
I investigate the role of underwriter certification by classifying rankings as Low when 
they are less than 9.0 otherwise they are designated as High. Table 15 reports the results of an 
analysis by underwriter reputation where Panel A summarizes returns by group (Low versus 
High). In addition to the five sets of returns reported in Table 9, I report results using the CRSP 
value-weighted index.58 I also compute returns over 12, 36 and 60 month horizons, to determine 
if the effect varies over time. 
I find that 36 month buy-and-hold returns of High underwriters consistently exceed those 
rated Low irrespective of the adjustment methodology. The differences are both economically 
and statistically significant. I also find that underwriter reputation determines 12 month returns in 
all cases. 
When the horizon is lengthened to 60 months, median buy-and-hold returns for High 
underwriters are statistically greater than those ranked as Low in all six cases. Overall, the 
evidence in Panel A indicates that underwriter reputation is positively related to the long-run 
stock performance of RLBO firms, with the maximum benefit occurring at 36 months. These 
findings support Hypothesis H4. Relatedly, Brav and Gompers’s (2003) findings show that 
offerings by higher quality underwriters have shorter lockups and a greater probability of an 
early release. Figure 6 graphs buy-and-hold returns by underwriter reputation. 
3.6.6.2 Multivariate Analysis: Underwriter Reputation and Post-RLBO Stock Price Performance 
To further validate the role of underwriter certification in RLBOs, Panel B reports OLS 
regressions that duplicate those of Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998). In this analysis the dependent 
variable is the 36 month buy-and-hold return. While the previous study only reports results using 
                                                 
58 While Barber and Lyon (1997) document the biases inherent in a reference index, value-weight adjusted returns 
provide comparability to the findings of Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998). 
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a value-weighted index, I employ the six sets of returns used in Table 15 (Panel A). Due to the 
lower cross-sectional variation in underwriter rankings, a dummy variable is employed (High 
Rank Dummy), which is set to one if CM is at least nine, otherwise it is zero. Standard errors are 
calculated using White’s (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity. Six configurations of the 
following model are reported in Table 15, Panel B: 
BHR = f(High Rank Dummy, log(Size), log(Age), Second, RetStdDev)  (10) 
Model 1 uses Raw Unadjusted returns as the dependent variable, and obtains a coefficient 
for High Rank Dummy which is positive and significant at better than 5 percent. Model 2 
duplicates the Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) regressions employing a value-weighted index, 
and the coefficient on High Rank Dummy is again significantly positive at the 5 percent level. 
Four additional specifications document that High Rank Dummy is positive and statistically 
significant at 5 percent when IPO Adjusted, Seasoned Firm Adjusted, Industry-Adjusted, and 
Control Firm Adjusted returns are employed. These findings provide additional evidence that 
underwriters fulfill a certification role for RLBOs, and supports Hypothesis H4. 
3.6.6.3. Four Factor Model Regressions of Underwriter Reputation 
To ensure that my findings are not the result of cross-sectional correlation, I perform a 
calendar time analysis using Carhart’s (1997) model, which is reported in Panel C. In these 
regressions, the mean monthly Raw Unadjusted return is the dependent variable. Panel C 
summarizes findings for rankings that are High, Low, and Low-High over 12, 36, and 60 months. 
Compounded returns are reported in curly braces. 
Consistent with the findings of Panels A and B, underwriters with a High ranking earn 
positive and significant 36 month returns, while those classified as Low generate negative returns 
that statistically differ from zero. When the dependent variable is the difference Low-High, the 
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intercept is highly significant, which supports the argument that underwriter reputation is 
important to the stock performance of RLBOs.  
When 60 months returns are employed, the Low-High effect is still significant, but with a 
smaller magnitude. When using returns over a 12 month horizon, the Low-High intercept is 
negatively significant. Overall, the findings of Table 15 suggest that underwriters perform a 
certification function similar to that for IPO firms. Offerings handled by higher quality 
underwriters lead to positive abnormal stock returns, which supports Hypothesis H4. 
3.7. Conclusions 
This chapter explores those factors that determine the long-run stock performance of 
public-to-private RLBOs. I first benchmark RLBO returns against those of IPOs, seasoned firms, 
industry medians, and a matched set of control firms. I then investigate whether private period 
restructuring that creates sales growth and a better than industry cost structure leads to superior 
stock performance after the RLBO. I also contribute to the literature by examining whether 
boards that include an executive committee, are negatively related to stock returns after the 
RLBO. Finally, I extend previous research into underwriter certification to public-to-private 
RLBOs.  
First, I find that public-to-private RLBO stock returns outperform comparable within 
industry IPOs at 12, 36, and 60 month horizons. Extending the analysis to seasoned firms obtains 
qualitatively similar results, though differences decline after approximately 36 months. 
Consistent with results obtained for seasoned firms, RLBOs outperform industry medians over 
the first 36 months after the offering. In contrast, abnormal stock returns calculated using control 
firms selected by size and industry obtains insignificant results. The evidence suggests that the 
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larger and more mature RLBOs do not suffer the underperformance documented for IPOs. No 
evidence is found of systematic market mispricing post-RLBO. 
Second, private period restructuring that increases growth leads to positive abnormal 
returns after the RLBO, and the relationship remains important into the post-RLBO years. I also 
find that equity markets respond favorably after the RLBO to improved cost structure from 
restructuring. In addition, cost structure continues to drive positive stock returns three and four 
years after the RLBO. 
Third, equity markets respond favorably to increased investment in capital expenditures. 
However, investments in capital assets post-RLBO beyond what is normal for a firm’s industry 
engender negative stock returns. Overall, the evidence suggests that equity markets value 
increases in capital expenditures when there are no signs of overinvestment. 
This is the first study to document the negative impact of executive committees on stock 
returns. I find that those RLBOs whose board includes this committee consistently earn lower 
stock returns than their industry peers even when other board composition variables are included 
in the regressions. Finally, the same underwriter certification role detected for IPOs also holds 
for public-to-private RLBOs, and the relationship is maximized at 36 months. 
I ensure the validity of my conclusions with multiple robustness checks. The analysis of 
buy-and-hold returns controls for excessive skewness and cross-sectional correlation. I use both 
means and medians to ameliorate the impact of outliers. Finally, I employ a Carhart (1997) 
model and calendar time returns as an additional robustness check against cross-sectional 
correlation. Finally, when testing the relationship between firm fundamentals and future stock 
returns, I use several approaches to test the validity of my results ensuring that they are robust. 
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Chapter 4: Conclusions 
This dissertation investigates and closes gaps in the literature on public-to-private reverse 
leveraged buyouts. Unlike prior research that uses samples primarily made up of private-to-
private and division-to-private RLBOs, I create a sample of exclusively public-to-private 
transactions. Chapter 2 begins with an analysis of restructuring activities undertaken during the 
private period, by comparing firm fundamentals at the LBO to the same variables after the 
RLBO. Next, I examine the determinants of post-RLBO valuation and whether restructuring 
leads to a more disciplined investment policy by management. This chapter also investigates 
those pre-LBO factors that are related to private period length. Finally, I examine the 
determinants of the high post-RLBO attrition rate documented in the literature. I validate the 
findings with multiple robustness tests. 
The analysis leads to several conclusions. First, I find that free cash flow and capital 
expenditures are above competition leading up to the LBO, while growth options are industry 
norms. I contend that these factors combined with low ownership concentration incentivize 
overinvestment. Second, increased leverage reduces free cash flow and capital expenditures 
during the private period, while ownership concentration increases.  
Third, after the RLBO, employment, free cash flow, and growth options increase as leverage 
decreases, while capital expenditures continue at industry levels. I argue that management 
remains disciplined once the firm returns to public ownership, as capital expenditures lead to 
positive future cash flows. Fourth, I show that restructuring that improves growth leads to higher 
valuations post-RLBO. The evidence suggests that growth enables the firm to survive the market 
for corporate control over five years after the RLBO. I also find that lower gross margins at the 
RLBO engender superior equity and firm values. 
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Finally, by limiting the sample to public-to-private RLBOs, I obtain evidence that the 
relationship between private period length and post-RLBO success is more complicated than first 
thought. While I obtain findings that support the business media advice to avoid “quick flips”, 
the evidence suggests that firms with extremely long private periods more closely resemble a 
first IPO.  
Chapter 3 investigates the long-run stock performance of public-to-private RLBOs which 
are second IPOs. This study tests whether empirical regularities observed for IPOs is also found 
in RLBOs. I then build on the work in Chapter 2 by examining the relationship between firm 
fundamentals during the private period and at the RLBO with long-run stock performance. Next, 
in the vein of corporate governance studies of IPOs, I analyze board characteristics that 
determine stock returns after the RLBO.  
First, the results suggest that RLBOs earn long-run stock returns superior to IPOs in the 
same industry at all horizons. Further, I obtain results using seasoned firms and industry medians 
that are qualitatively similar, though differences decline after 36 months. Insignificant abnormal 
returns using control firms selected by size and industry, suggests that RLBO stock returns do 
not suffer from market mispricing. 
Next, I find that private period restructuring that engenders growth is as important to long-
run stock returns as to valuations. I also find that continued growth after restructuring leads to 
superior stock performance up to four years after the RLBO. In addition, RLBOs with a lower 
cost structure at the RLBO consistently earn higher returns in the post-RLBO months. I also 
obtain evidence suggesting that executive committees lead to negative abnormal stock returns 
post-RLBO. Finally, analysis shows that higher quality underwriters are positively correlated to 
stock returns after the RLBO, and the relationship is maximized at 36 months.  
74 
 
Overall, this dissertation demonstrates that public-to-private RLBOs differs substantively 
from the division-to-private and private-to-private types common in the literature. I argue that 
asymmetric information is lower at a public offering when a firm was previously exchange 
listed. 
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Definition of Firm Characteristics 
Assets – The book value of total assets (item #6) in real 2000 dollars 
Sales – Net sales (item #12) in real 2000 dollars 
Capex/Sales – Capital expenditures (item #128) divided by sales (item #12) 
CashTA – Cash (item #1) divided by total assets (item #6) 
COGSSls – Cost of goods sold (item #41) divided by sales (item #12) 
DivDummy – Set to one if dividends (items #19 + #21) are not equal to zero 
DivTA – Dividends (items #19 + #21) divided by total assets (item #6) 
EBITDA/Sales – Operating income before depreciation (item #13) divided by sales (item #12) 
Employees – The number of employees (item #29) 
FCF/Sales – Earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (item #13) minus interest expense (item 
#15) minus taxes (item #16) minus dividends (items #9 + #21) divided by sales (item #12) 
IntanTA – Intangible assets (item #33) to total assets (item #6) 
InterestTA – Interest expense (item #15) divided by total assets (item #6) 
Leverage – Long-term debt (items #9 + #44) divided by total assets (item #6) 
MktBook – Total Assets (item #6) – common equity (item #60) plus market value of equity (items #199 * 
#25) divided by total assets (item #6) 
PSlsRatio – Market value of equity (items #199 * #25) divided by sales (item #12)  
PPETA – Net property, plant, and equipment (item #8) divided by total assets (item #6) 
RetTA – Retained earnings (item #36) divided by total assets (item #6) 
ROA – Earnings before interest (items #172 + #15) divided by total assets (item #6) 
ROE – Net income (item #172) divided by stockholders’ equity (item #216) 
R&D/Sales – Research and development expenses (item #46) divided by sales (item #12) 
Sales/Employee – Sales (item #12) divided by employees (item #29) 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
SG&A/Sales – Selling, general, and administrative expense (item #189) divided by sales (item #12) 
Shares/Owner – Equity shares (item #25) divided by common shareholders (item #100) in thousands 
TaxRate – Income taxes (item #16) divided by earnings after interest and depreciation (item #178) 
Tunover – Shares traded (item #28) divided by shares outstanding (item #25) 
Definition of Equity Variables 
StockPrice – Stock price at the end of the last trading day of the month. 
Beta – Firm beta based on stock returns from offer date + 6 through offer date + 260 
BHR12 – Twelve month buy-and-hold return 
BHR36 – Thirty-six month buy-and-hold return 
BHR60 – Sixty month buy-and-hold return 
BHR1336 – Buy-and-hold return from the 13th to 36th month 
BHR3760 – Buy-and-hold return from the 37th to 60th month 
BHR1360 – Buy-and-hold return from the 13th to 60th month 
HML – Carhart (1997) high minus low factor 
MOM – Carhart (1997) momentum factor – Monthly stock return 
SMB – Carhart (1997) small minus big factor 
StdDevRet – Standard deviation of daily stock return from offer date + 6 through offer date + 260 
RLBO Transaction Variable Definitions 
RLBOYearse – The time from the LBO until the RLBO 
RLBOYearsSq – Years in the private period squared 
Surviveflag – A binary variable set to one if an RLBO firm survives five years 
MBO – Dummy set to one if LBO was through a management buyout. 
Delist – Dummy set to one if firm is delisted from CRSP due to bankruptcy or insufficient capital 
Age – Firm age in years 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
Second – Percentage of secondary shares in the public offering 
Size – Proceeds of the public offering 
LBOCount – Count of leveraged buyouts occurring in a month 
TermPremium – The difference between 10 year T-bond and 3 mo. T-bill rates for a given month 
Governance Variables 
BlockPct – Voting percentage of outside blockholders of at least 5 percent 
CEOPct – Voting percentage of the chief executive officer 
P/EPct – Voting percentage of the private equity firm 
TotalPct – Voting percentage of officers and directors of the firm 
UndwRank – Updated Carter and Manaster underwriter ranking 
High – Carter and Manaster underwriter ranking of at least 9.0 
Low - Carter and Manaster underwriter ranking of less than 9.0 
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APPENDIX B: FILES AND DATABASES 
Compustat Name file 
Compustat Fundamentals table 
Compustat Daily Segments file 
CRSP Stockname file 
CRSP Daily Price file 
CRSP Monthly Price file 
CRSP Monthly Stock Index file 
SDC New Issues database 
SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database 
Gale Business and Company Resource center 
SEC EDGAR database 
Mergent Online 
Lexis/Nexis Academic 
Thompson Research 
Federal Reserve Bank 3 month T-bill table of interest rates 
Federal Reserve Bank 10 year T-bond table of interest rates 
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APPENDIX C: TABLES 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Reverse Leveraged Buyout Firms 
 
The table presents summary statistics of sample firms. Firms by year of the LBO and RLBO are documented in 
Panel A.  Panel B reports RLBOs by years in the private period.  Panel C summarizes the mean and quartiles of 
private period duration.  Panel D classifies sample firms by 2-digit SIC code. 
Panel A: RLBOs by Year  Panel B: RLBOs by Years Private 
 
Year 
LBO 
Count 
RLBO 
Count 
Years 
Private b Firm Count 
Percent of 
Total 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1978 2 0 0.0 – 0.9 24 11.5% 11.5% 
1979 6 0 1.0 – 1.9 27 13.0% 24.5% 
1980 3 0 2.0 – 2.9 22 10.6% 35.1% 
1981 7 0 3.0 – 3.9 23 11.1% 46.2% 
1982 1 0 4.0 – 4.9 28 13.5% 59.6% 
1983 5 0 5.0 – 5.9 19 9.1% 68.8% 
1984 11 0 6 .0 – 6.9 14 6.7% 75.5% 
1985 10 0 7.0 – 7.9 8 3.8% 79.3% 
1986 22 8 8.0 – 8.9 6 2.9% 82.2% 
1987 17 10 9.0 – 9.9 8 3.8% 86.1% 
1988 34 3 10.0 – 10.9 2 1.0% 87.0% 
1989 22 2 11.0 – 11.9 4 1.9% 88.9% 
1990 9 5 12.0 – 12.9 4 1.9% 90.9% 
1991 3 29 13.0 – 13.9 1 0.5% 91.3% 
1992 5 33 14.0 – 14.9 2 1.0% 92.3% 
1993 4 24 15.0 – 15.9 3 1.4% 93.8% 
1994 3 14 16.0 – 16.9 4 1.9% 95.7% 
1995 0 9 17.0 – 17.9 4 1.9% 97.6% 
1996 4 4 19.0 – 19.9 3 1.4% 99.0% 
1997 8 12 20.0 – 20.9 1 0.5% 99.5% 
1998 6 1 23.0 – 23.9 1 0.5% 100.0% 
1999 4 4 Total 208 100.0%  
2000 4 2  
2001 4 6 
2002 4 5 
2003 6 4 
2004 4 11 
2005 0 10 
2006 0 12 
Total 208 208 
 
 
 
Panel C: RLBO Private Period Statistics 
Statistic 
Days 
Private 
Years 
Privatea 
Mean 1,992.06 5.458 
1st Quartile 734.00 2.011 
Median 1,600.00 4.384 
3rd Quartile 2,520.50 6.905 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
 
   Panel D: Reverse Leveraged Buyouts by 2-Digit SIC Code 
SIC Code SIC Code Description Firms % of Total 
07 Agricultural services 1 0.48% 
12 Coal mining 1 0.48% 
13 Oil and gas extraction 3 1.44% 
14 Mining and quarrying 1 0.48% 
15 Building construction 3 1.44% 
17 Special trade contractors 1 0.48% 
20 Food 5 2.40% 
21 Tobacco 2 0.96% 
22 Textiles 6 2.88% 
23 Apparel 3 1.44% 
24 Lumber products 3 1.44% 
25 Furniture 4 1.92% 
26 Paper products 2 0.96% 
27 Printing and publishing 3 1.44% 
28 Chemicals 7 3.37% 
29 Petroleum refining 1 0.48% 
32 Stone, clay, glass, and concrete 2 0.96% 
33 Primary metal products 5 2.40% 
34 Fabricated metal products 6 2.88% 
35 Machinery and computer equip. 13 6.25% 
36 Electronic equipment 17 8.17% 
37 Transportation equipment 7 3.37% 
38 Instruments, watches and clocks 4 1.92% 
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 5 2.40% 
40 Railroad transportation 2 0.96% 
41 Ground transportation 1 0.48% 
42 Warehousing and transportation 3 1.44% 
44 Water transportation 2 0.96% 
45 Air transportation 2 0.96% 
47 Transportation services 1 0.48% 
48 Communications 7 3.37% 
49 Energy and sanitary services 2 0.96% 
50 Wholesale trade – durables 6 2.88% 
51 Wholesale trade – nondurables 1 0.48% 
52 Building materials 2 0.96% 
53 General merchandise stores 2 0.96% 
54 Food stores 10 4.81% 
55 Automotive dealers and service 1 0.48% 
56 Apparel stores 8 3.85% 
57 Home furniture 4 1.92% 
58 Eating and drinking businesses 4 1.92% 
59 Miscellaneous retail 8 3.85% 
72 Personal services 2 0.96% 
73 Business services 9 4.33% 
75 Automotive repair 2 0.96% 
78 Motion pictures 3 1.44% 
79 Recreation services 2 0.96% 
80 Health services 12 5.77% 
82 Education services 2 0.96% 
87 Engineering services 5 2.40% 
Total  208 100.00% 
     a RLBO – Defined as a public firm that first becomes private and then public again 
     b Years Private – Interval between the LBO and RLBO where a firm remains private. 
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Table 5 
Regression of Valuation Following the RLBO 
 
This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is industry-adjusted PSlsRatio 
(Panel A) or MktBook (Panel B) after the RLBO. All independent variables are industry-adjusted. The sample 
consists of RLBOs from 1986 to 2006. Variables as of immediately after the RLBO are designated RLBO+0. The 
time in the private period is designated as LBO to RLBO. Five years after the RLBO is defined as RLBO+5. P-
values are reported in parenthesis. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  a, b, and c denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. All variables are industry-adjusted with the median of the 2-digit SIC 
code. 
Panel A: OLS regression of post-RLBO price to sales ratio for RLBO firms 
Explanatory 
Variable Time Period Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept  0.093 
(0.74) 
0.201 
(0.58) 
-0.036 
(0.91) 
Log(Assets) RLBO+0 -0.026 
(0.65) 
-0.126 
(0.15) 
-0.058 
(0.37) 
Leverage RLBO+0 -0.236 
(0.42) 
-0.121 
(0.66) 
-0.328 
(0.24) 
PPETA RLBO+0 0.095 
(0.87) 
-0.316 
(0.61) 
-0.307 
(0.61) 
COGSSls RLBO+0 -3.825a 
(0.00) 
-3.711a 
(0.00) 
-4.972a 
(0.00) 
Growth LBO to RLBO 0.059a 
(0.00) 
0.035a 
(0.00) 
0.054a 
(0.00) 
∆R&D/Sales LBO to RLBO 12.024a 
(0.00) 
 14.239a 
(0.00) 
∆Capex/Sales LBO to RLBO   0.298 
(0.74) 
∆Shares/Own LBO to RLBO  0.000b 
(0.03) 
0.000c
(0.07) 
∆SG&A/Sales LBO to RLBO   -2.798a 
(0.01) 
RLBOYears LBO to RLBO 0.020 
(0.44) 
-0.004 
(0.89) 
0.007 
(0.74) 
Delist RLBO+5 -0.162 
(0.43) 
-0.199 
(0.41) 
-0.176 
(0.46) 
TermPremium RLBO+0 1.771 
(0.80) 
4.450 
(0.57) 
8.898 
(0.25) 
F-Statistic  9.06a 5.42a 8.59a 
Adjusted R2  0.307 0.221 0.424 
Year Dummies  No No No 
Number of observations  165 141 125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85 
 
 
Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel A (continued) 
Explanatory 
Variable Time Period Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept  0.021 
(0.93) 
0.157 
(0.60) 
-0.137 
(0.63) 
Log(Assets) RLBO+0 -0.040 
(0.46) 
-0.134 
(0.11) 
-0.083 
(0.17) 
PPETA RLBO+0 0.015 
(0.98) 
-0.352 
(0.56) 
-0.421 
(0.48) 
COGSSls RLBO+0 -3.765a 
(0.00) 
-3.681a 
(0.00) 
-4.751a 
(0.00) 
Growth LBO to RLBO 0.060a 
(0.00) 
0.036a 
(0.00) 
0.054a 
(0.00) 
∆R&D/Sales LBO to RLBO 11.974a 
(0.01) 
 13.841a 
(0.00) 
∆Capex/Sales LBO to RLBO   0.288 
(0.75) 
∆Shares/Own LBO to RLBO  0.000b 
(0.03) 
0.000c 
(0.05) 
∆SG&A/Sales LBO to RLBO   -2.607a 
(0.01) 
RLBOYears LBO to RLBO 0.020 
(0.40) 
-0.003 
(0.91) 
0.008 
(0.71) 
Delist RLBO+5 -0.182 
(0.39) 
-0.221 
(0.36) 
-0.206 
(0.39) 
TermPremium RLBO+0 3.438 
(0.60) 
5.739 
(0.43) 
11.334 
(0.11) 
F-Statistic  10.75a 6.77a 9.80a 
Adjusted R2  0.316 0.242 0.431 
Year Dummies  No No No 
Number of observations  170 146 129 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel B: OLS regression of post-RLBO market-to-book ratio for RLBO firms 
Explanatory 
Variable Time Period Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept  -0.231 
(0.40) 
-0.262 
(0.37) 
-0.200 
(0.55) 
Log(Assets) RLBO+0 -0.125b 
(0.01) 
-0.158a 
(0.01) 
-0.158b 
(0.01) 
Leverage RLBO+0 0.990a 
(0.00) 
0.994a 
(0.00) 
0.887a 
(0.00) 
PPETA RLBO+0 -0.468 
(0.34) 
-0.791 
(0.14) 
-0.654 
(0.27) 
COGSSls RLBO+0 -2.017a 
(0.01) 
-2.053a 
(0.01) 
-2.940a 
(0.00) 
Growth LBO to RLBO 0.028a 
(0.00) 
0.020b 
(0.01) 
0.028a 
(0.01) 
∆R&D/Sales LBO to RLBO 4.042c 
(0.06) 
 4.105 
(0.11) 
∆Capex/Sales LBO to RLBO   1.310a 
(0.01) 
∆Shares/Own LBO to RLBO  0.000a 
(0.00) 
0.000b 
(0.01) 
∆SG&A/Sales LBO to RLBO   -0.853 
(0.37) 
RLBOYears LBO to RLBO 0.044c 
(0.05) 
0.032 
(0.12) 
0.027 
(0.19) 
Delist RLBO+5 -0.328c 
(0.05) 
-0.405b 
(0.02) 
-0.433b 
(0.01) 
TermPremium RLBO+0 9.949 
(0.12) 
14.521b 
(0.02) 
15.700b 
(0.03) 
F-Statistic  6.30a 6.41a 5.57a 
Adjusted R2  0.225 0.258 0.307 
Year Dummies  No No No 
Number of observations  165 141 125 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel B (continued) 
Explanatory 
Variable Time Period Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept  0.030 
(0.91) 
-0.004 
(0.99) 
0.029 
(0.92) 
Log(Assets) RLBO+0 -0.089c 
(0.08) 
-0.114b 
(0.05) 
-0.107c 
(0.08) 
PPETA RLBO+0 -0.136 
(0.78) 
-0.447 
(0.41) 
-0.394 
(0.51) 
COGSSls RLBO+0 -2.461a 
(0.00) 
-2.597a 
(0.00) 
-3.587a 
(0.00) 
Growth LBO to RLBO 0.026b 
(0.01) 
0.019b 
(0.02) 
0.027b 
(0.02) 
∆R&D/Sales LBO to RLBO 3.987c 
(0.07) 
 4.767c 
(0.07) 
∆Capex/Sales LBO to RLBO   1.355a 
(0.00) 
∆Shares/Own LBO to RLBO  0.000b 
(0.02) 
0.000b 
(0.03) 
∆SG&A/Sales LBO to RLBO   -1.203 
(0.23) 
RLBOYears LBO to RLBO 0.044c 
(0.06) 
0.033 
(0.13) 
0.027 
(0.21) 
Delist RLBO+5 -0.290c 
(0.05) 
-0.329b 
(0.05) 
-0.369b 
(0.03) 
TermPremium RLBO+0 6.482 
(0.33) 
10.724 
(0.11) 
11.834c 
(0.09) 
F-Statistic  5.09a 5.17a 4.98a 
Adjusted R2  0.162 0.187 0.255 
Year Dummies  No No No 
Number of observations  170 146 129 
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Table 6 
Regression of Time in the Private Period 
 
This table summarizes regressions of pre-LBO factors impacting private period duration. The sample consists of 
RLBOs between 1986 and 2006. Panel A employs a Tobit specification with RLBOYears as dependent variable, 
while Panel B utilizes an OLS regression where the regressand is the natural logarithm of one plus RLBOYears. A 
prefix of LBO-0 indicates that the value is immediately before the LBO, while LBO-1 precedes a variable when it 
indicates that the value is for one year earlier. All variables are defined in Appendix A. P-values are reported in 
parenthesis.  a, b, and c denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. All variables are 
industry-adjusted by 2-digit SIC code medians. 
Panel A: Tobit regressions 
Explanatory 
Variables Time Period Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept  -9.481c 
(0.07) 
-12.994b 
(0.04) 
-6.821 
(0.25) 
14.608a 
(0.00) 
5.900b 
(0.02) 
Log(Assets) LBO-0 0.912b 
(0.01) 
0.998b 
(0.02) 
-0.157 
(0.67) 
0.448 
(0.21) 
1.295b 
(0.01) 
Leverage LBO-0 -11.087a 
(0.01) 
-9.342a 
(0.00) 
-9.462a 
(0.00) 
-6.154b 
(0.04) 
-13.371a 
(0.01) 
FCF/Sales (Pre1987) LBO-0 24.437 
(0.40) 
31.038 
(0.36) 
   
FCF/Sales (Post1986) LBO-0 -31.696a 
(0.00) 
-33.096a 
(0.00) 
   
IntanTA LBO-0 -20.926a 
(0.00) 
-19.609a 
(0.00) 
   
CashTA LBO-0    8.750 
(0.12) 
17.710b 
(0.03) 
Sales/Employee LBO-0    -0.001 
(0.81) 
 
DivTA LBO-0 51.675 
(0.14) 
58.221 
(0.15) 
90.810a 
(0.01) 
16.440 
(0.60) 
14.533 
(0.73) 
Proceeds/Sales LBO-0    -0.003 
(0.93) 
 
ROA LBO-0  9.182 
(0.33) 
   
ROE LBO-0 -1.205 
(0.69) 
    
Capex/Sales LBO-1   -10.354a 
(0.00) 
  
R&D/Sales LBO-0   44.848c 
(0.09) 
  
TaxRate (Pre1987) LBO-0   4.327c 
(0.08) 
  
TaxRate (Post1986) LBO-0   -1.596 
(0.40) 
  
MBO LBO-0 3.022b 
(0.05) 
2.625 
(0.12) 
4.243b 
(0.02) 
-1.408 
(0.38) 
 
LBOCount LBO-0     -0.267a 
(0.00) 
TermPremium LBO-0     -168.050b 
(0.01) 
FCF/Sales (χ2)  3.31c 3.24c N/A N/A N/A 
TaxRate (χ2)  N/A N/A 3.61c N/A N/A 
Year Dummies  No No No Yes No 
Num. of Observations  136 148 165 159 172 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: OLS regressions 
Explanatory Variables Time Period Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept  0.716a 
(0.00) 
0.672a 
(0.01) 
1.064a 
(0.00) 
2.630a 
(0.00) 
1.835a 
(0.00) 
Log(Assets) LBO-0 0.094b 
(0.01) 
0.085b
(0.03) 
-0.021 
(0.45) 
0.015 
(0.64) 
0.093a 
(0.00) 
Leverage LBO-0 -0.994a 
(0.01) 
-0.537b 
(0.05) 
-0.578b 
(0.02) 
-0.335b 
(0.05) 
-0.439a 
(0.01) 
FCF/Sales (Pre1987) LBO-0 3.318 
(0.27) 
3.829 
(0.22) 
   
FCF/Sales (Post1986) LBO-0 -2.497a 
(0.00) 
-2.049a 
(0.00) 
   
IntanTA LBO-0 -1.696a 
(0.00) 
-1.343a
(0.01) 
   
CashTA LBO-0    0.634 
(0.25) 
1.600a 
(0.00) 
Sales/Employee LBO-0    -0.001 
(0.23) 
 
DivTA LBO-0 5.521 
(0.10) 
5.727 
(0.11) 
7.520b 
(0.02) 
2.919 
(0.28) 
2.999 
(0.33) 
Proceeds/Sales LBO-0    -0.000 
(0.45) 
 
ROA LBO-0  0.074 
(0.93) 
   
ROE LBO-0 -0.184 
(0.66) 
    
Capex/Sales LBO-1   -0.592a 
(0.01) 
  
R&D/Sales LBO-0   2.904 
(0.19) 
  
TaxRate (Pre1987) LBO-0   0.301 
(0.19) 
  
TaxRate (Post1986) LBO-0   -0.013 
(0.95) 
  
MBO LBO-0 0.196 
(0.26) 
0.109 
(0.58) 
0.219 
(0.12) 
-0.169 
(0.24) 
 
LBO Count LBO-0     -0.010b 
(0.02) 
TermPremium LBO-0     -12.113a 
(0.00) 
F-Statistic  3.86a 2.85a 3.29a 3.37a 8.33a 
FCF/Sales (χ2)  3.37c 3.51c N/A N/A N/A 
TaxRate (χ2)  N/A N/A 1.00 N/A N/A 
Adjusted R2  0.372 0.262 0.281 0.298 0.205 
Year Dummies  No No No Yes No 
Num. of Observations  136 148 165 159 172 
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Table 7 
Regression of Free Cash Flow 
 
This table summarizes the results of regressions where the dependent variable (FCF/Sales) is free cash flow. The 
sample consists of RLBOs between 1986 and 2006. Models 1, 2, and 3 include only RLBO firms. Control firms 
matched on size and industry are included in Model 4. A prefix of LBO-0 indicates that the value is for the year of 
the LBO, while RLBO+0 is at the RLBO. Independent variables with no prefix are from the same time as the 
dependent variable. A prefix of LBO-1 or RLBO-1 indicates that it is for one year earlier than for the dependent 
variable. The time in the private period is designated as LBO to RLBO. Model 2 is the second stage of Heckman’s 
(1978) two-step process. In Model 4 interaction terms with (RLBO) in parenthesis, are for RLBO firms. Variables 
with either (IPO) or (Seas) in parenthesis are interaction terms for controls that either are IPOs or seasoned firms. P-
values are reported in parenthesis. Chi-squared statistics test hypotheses that variables are jointly zero. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. a, b, and c denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
Standard errors are calculated using White’s (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity. All variables are industry-
adjusted with the median of the 2-digit SIC code. 
Dependent Variable FCF/Sales at the LBO FCF/Sales at the RLBO 
Explanatory Variables Time Period Model 1 Model 2 Time Period Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept  0.001 
(0.91) 
-0.116 
(0.57) 
 0.035 
(0.23) 
0.159c 
(0.08) 
Log(Assets) LBO-0 0.014a 
(0.01) 
0.016a 
(0.00) 
RLBO+0 0.012b 
(0.02) 
0.014a 
(0.00) 
MktBook LBO-0 0.038 
(0.13) 
0.036 
(0.16) 
RLBO+0 0.022a 
(0.00) 
0.029a 
(0.00) 
DivTA LBO-0 -0.665 
(0.14) 
-0.679 
(0.13) 
RLBO+0 -1.496a 
(0.00) 
-1.030a 
(0.00) 
Leverage LBO-0 -0.035 
(0.41) 
-0.034 
(0.42) 
RLBO+0 -0.024 
(0.16) 
-0.030 
(0.22) 
TaxRate LBO-0 0.047c 
(0.10) 
0.045 
(0.13) 
   
TaxRatePre1987 LBO-0 -0.087b 
(0.03) 
-0.087b 
(0.03) 
   
Sales/Employee LBO-1 0.000b 
(0.02) 
0.000b 
(0.03) 
   
Capex/Sales LBO-1 0.012 
(0.89) 
0.008 
(0.93) 
   
Capex/Sales(RLBO)    RLBO-1 0.310a 
(0.00) 
0.322a 
(0.00) 
Capex/Sales(IPO)    RLBO-1  -1.182a 
(0.00) 
Capex/Sales(Seas)    RLBO-1  0.294a 
(0.00) 
Delist    RLBO+5 0.027 
(0.12) 
-0.024 
(0.30) 
RLBOYearsSq    LBO to RLBO 0.000 
(0.42) 
 
MBO    LBO-0 0.008 
(0.65) 
 
Mills LBO-0  0.035 
(0.56) 
   
F-Statistic  3.76a 3.38a  6.10a 16.58a 
TaxRate (χ2)  4.53b 4.17b  N/A N/A 
Capex (χ2)  N/A N/A  N/A 7.31a 
Adjusted R2  0.125 0.121  0.447 0.482 
Year Dummies  No No  Yes Yes 
Num. of observations  156 156  178 369 
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Table 8 
Regression of Five Year Survival Probability Following the RLBO 
 
This table summarizes the results of a Logit regression where the dependent variable (Surviveflag) is set to one for 
firms still publicly listed in CRSP five years after the RLBO. The sample consists of RLBOs from 1986 to 2006. A 
prefix of LBO-0 indicates that the value is for the year of the LBO, while RLBO+0 is immediately after the RLBO. 
The time in the private period is designated as LBO to RLBO. P-values are reported in parenthesis. All variables are 
defined in Appendix A.  a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. All 
variables are industry-adjusted with the median of the 2-digit SIC code. 
Explanatory 
Variable Time Period Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Model 6 
Intercept  -0.117 
(0.76) 
-0.155 
(0.70) 
-0.256 
(0.54) 
-0.225 
(0.68) 
-0.077 
(0.85) 
-0.551 
(0.27) 
Log(Assets) RLBO+0 0.049 
(0.70) 
0.076 
(0.57) 
0.144 
(0.32) 
0.053 
(0.68) 
0.142 
(0.28) 
0.066 
(0.60) 
RLBOYears LBO to RLBO 0.208b 
(0.04) 
0.210b
(0.04) 
0.234b 
(0.03) 
0.200c 
(0.05) 
0.210b 
(0.04) 
0.207b 
(0.05) 
RLBOYearsSq LBO to RLBO -0.009c 
(0.09) 
-0.010c 
(0.08) 
-0.010c 
(0.07) 
-0.008
(0.12) 
-0.010c 
(0.08) 
-0.009c 
(0.10) 
MktBook RLBO+0 0.490b
(0.01) 
0.512b
(0.01) 
0.602a
(0.01) 
0.361b
(0.04) 
0.377b 
(0.03) 
0.445b
(0.02) 
ROA RLBO+0   -2.342 
(0.32) 
   
Leverage RLBO+0 -0.741 
(0.22) 
-0.778 
(0.21) 
-0.778 
(0.27) 
-0.418 
(0.49) 
-0.359 
(0.55) 
-0.626 
(0.30) 
PPETA RLBO+0     -1.343 
(0.17) 
 
∆Sales/Employee LBO to RLBO     -0.002b 
(0.05) 
 
SG&A/Sales RLBO+0   -0.660 
(0.65) 
   
Capex/Sales RLBO+0 2.065 
(0.29) 
     
R&D/Sales RLBO+0 -5.468 
(0.29) 
     
Div/TA RLBO+0  7.299 
(0.24) 
    
FCF/Sales RLBO+0  1.191 
(0.60) 
    
TaxRate RLBO+0    1.015c 
(0.07) 
 1.031c 
(0.07) 
TermPremium RLBO+0    7.600 
(0.61) 
  
LBOCount LBO-0      0.025c 
(0.09) 
Pseudo R2  0.090 0.102 0.109 0.101 0.111 0.120 
Sample Size  197 193 178 197 195 197 
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Table 9 
Long-run Stock Returns after the RLBO 
 
This table summarizes long-run stock returns. Abnormal returns are adjusted by IPO firms in the 
same industry, seasoned firms in the same industry, all firms in an industry, and control firms. 
IPO adjusted returns are based on the 1-digit SIC code median. The median 2-digit SIC code is 
used to adjust RLBO firm buy-and-hold returns in the other cases. Control firms are the closest 
in size in the same industry. The 2-digit SIC code is used to determine the industry unless no 
matches are found. The remaining matching firms are based on the 1-digit SIC code. Buy-and-
hold returns are winsorized at the 3rd standard deviation. All variables are defined in Appendix 
A. a, b, and c denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Panels A 
and B p-values in parenthesis are based on paired differences, while brackets indicate unpaired 
group tests. Curly braces in Panels C and D represent compounded monthly intercepts over the 
sample time period. 
Panel A: Cumulative 12, 36, and 60 month buy-and-hold returns 
 12 Month Returns 36 Month Returns 60 Month Returns 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Raw Returns 0.155a 
(0.00) 
0.111a
(0.00) 
0.446a
(0.00) 
0.233a
(0.00) 
0.642a 
(0.00) 
0.161a 
(0.00) 
IPO Adjusted 0.221a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.174a
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.597a
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.355a
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.872a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.399a
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
Seasoned Firm Adjusted 0.159a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.120a
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.467a
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.213a
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.704a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.251a
(0.00) 
[0.01]s 
Industry-Adjusted 0.161a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.125a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.479a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.256a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.722a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.259a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
Control Firm Adjusted -0.010 
(0.84) 
[0.83] 
0.002
(0.82) 
[0.93] 
0.027
(0.82) 
[0.97] 
-0.051
(0.93) 
[0.89] 
-0.358 
(0.23) 
[0.17] 
-0.076
(0.24) 
[0.12] 
 
Panel B: Cumulative 12 to 36, 36 to 60, and 12 to 60 month returns 
 13 to 36 Month Returns 37 to 60 Month Returns 13 to 60 Month Returns 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Raw Returns 0.219a 
(0.00) 
0.115a
(0.00) 
0.122c 
(0.06) 
0.032
(0.65) 
0.325a 
(0.00) 
0.022b 
(0.03) 
IPO Adjusted 0.314a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.208a
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.244a
(0.00) 
[0.01]a 
0.116a
(0.00) 
[0.03]b 
0.501a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.231a
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
Seasoned Firm Adjusted 0.233a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.111a
(0.00) 
[0.01]b 
0.166a
(0.01) 
[0.04]b 
0.066c
(0.08) 
[0.37] 
0.376a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.113a
(0.00) 
[0.05]b 
Industry-Adjusted 0.244a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.132a 
(0.00) 
[0.01]a 
0.122c 
(0.06) 
[0.09]c 
0.032 
(0.65) 
[0.29] 
0.325a 
(0.00) 
[0.00]a 
0.022b 
(0.03) 
[0.59] 
Control Firm Adjusted 0.030 
(0.68) 
[0.87] 
0.015
(0.70) 
[0.84] 
-0.205b
(0.04) 
[0.21] 
-0.087b 
(0.03) 
[0.02]b 
-0.211 
(0.18) 
[0.12] 
-0.039
(0.49) 
[0.16] 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Intercepts from four factor model regressions 
 12 Month 36 Month 60 Month 
Raw Returns -0.004
(0.38) 
{-0.050} 
-0.002 
(0.51) 
{-0.067} 
-0.003 
(0.34) 
{-0.143} 
IPO Adjusted 0.009b
(0.04) 
{0.110} 
0.012a
(0.00) 
{0.534} 
0.011a 
(0.00) 
{0.948} 
Seasoned Firm Adjusted 0.006b
(0.01) 
{0.077} 
0.008a
(0.00) 
{0.340} 
0.008a 
(0.00) 
{0.591} 
Industry-Adjusted 0.006a 
(0.01) 
{0.079} 
0.008a 
(0.00) 
{0.349} 
0.008a 
(0.00) 
{0.622} 
Control Firm Adjusted -0.007
(0.23) 
{-0.084} 
-0.004
(0.32) 
{-0.119} 
-0.005 
(0.11) 
{-0.259} 
 
Panel D: Intercepts from four factor model regressions 
 13 to 36 Month 37 to 60 Month 13 to 60 Month 
Raw Returns -0.002 
(0.58) 
{-0.048} 
-0.003 
(0.52) 
{-0.078} 
-0.002 
(0.46) 
{-0.108} 
IPO Adjusted 0.012a
(0.00) 
{0.344} 
0.010b
(0.03) 
{0.263} 
0.012a 
(0.00) 
{0.744} 
Seasoned Firm Adjusted 0.008b
(0.03) 
{0.197} 
0.006
(0.19) 
{0.167} 
0.008b 
(0.01) 
{0.437} 
Industry-Adjusted 0.008b 
(0.03) 
{0.216} 
0.007 
(0.15) 
{0.185} 
0.008a 
(0.01) 
{0.481} 
Control Firm Adjusted -0.001
(0.85) 
{-0.019} 
-0.005
(0.43) 
{-0.110} 
-0.003 
(0.48) 
{-0.115} 
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Table 10 
Corporate Governance Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports corporate governance summary statistics for both RLBO and matched control firms. Control firms 
are the closest in book value of assets in the same industry where proxy statements are available. The 2-digit SIC 
code is used to determine the industry unless no matches are found. The remaining control firms are selected using 
the 1-digit SIC code. RLBO firm proxy statements are the first submitted after the public offering. Private equity 
firm directors are classified as Grey. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Statistical differences in means and 
medians are reported.  a, b, and c denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 Means Medians 
Variable RLBO Control 
RLBO –  
Control RLBO Control 
RLBO –  
Control 
Inside Percent 0.471 0.242 0.229a 0.513 0.120 0.268a 
CEO Percent 0.068 0.077 -0.009 0.023 0.014 0.003 
P/E Percent 0.330 0.000 N/A 0.350 0.000 N/A 
Block Percent 0.096 0.130 -0.036a 0.055 0.090 -0.036a 
Directors 7.694 8.729 -1.049a 7.000 8.000 -1.000a 
%Outside Directors 0.341 0.608 -0.269a 0.333 0.625 -0.275a 
%Inside Directors 0.274 0.264 0.011 0.250 0.222 0.017 
%Grey Directors 0.388 0.127 0.263a 0.429 0.111 0.278a 
CEO Duality 0.676 0.705 -0.029 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Meetings 5.540 6.686 -1.188a 5.000 6.000 -1.000a 
Classified Board 0.522 0.522 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Dual Class Stock 0.122 0.140 -0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 
G-Index 7.024 8.933 -1.913a 7.000 9.000 -2.000a 
E-Index 1.788 2.288 -0.667a 2.000 2.000 -1.000a 
CEO Age 52.069 53.903 -1.750b 51.500 53.000 -2.000b 
CEO Tenure 4.275 8.449 -3.975a 3.000 6.000 -3.000a 
Committees 2.892 3.198 -0.296a 3.000 3.000 0.000a 
Comp Comm 0.946 0.961 -0.015 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Nom Comm 0.281 0.493 -0.217a 0.000 0.000 0.000a 
Exec Comm 0.414 0.415 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sample Size 207 207 
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Table 11 
Private Period Restructuring and Stock Returns Following the RLBO 
 
This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is 12 month returns (Panel A) or 
36 month returns (Panel B) after the RLBO. All independent variables are industry-adjusted. The sample consists of 
RLBOs from 1986 to 2006. P-values are reported in parenthesis. All variables are defined in Appendix A.  a, b, and c 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. All variables are industry-adjusted with the 
median of the 2-digit SIC code. 
Panel A: OLS regression of post-RLBO industry-adjusted 12 month buy-and-hold returns 
Explanatory 
Variable Time Period Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept  0.266b 
(0.03) 
0.095 
(0.39) 
0.248c 
(0.05) 
Log(Assets) RLBO+0  0.038 
(0.20) 
0.014 
(0.68) 
Leverage RLBO+0 0.279c 
(0.05) 
0.234 
(0.12) 
0.249c 
(0.10) 
PPETA RLBO+0 -0.147c 
(0.09) 
  
Growth LBO to RLBO 0.009a 
(0.01) 
  
∆Shares/Owner LBO to RLBO 0.000 
(0.32) 
 0.000 
(0.86) 
∆R&D/Sales LBO to RLBO  0.488 
(0.43) 
 
∆Capex/Sales LBO to RLBO   0.365b 
(0.02) 
∆ROA LBO to RLBO  0.737b 
(0.04) 
1.030b 
(0.02) 
RLBOYears LBO to RLBO -0.007 
(0.29) 
-0.006 
(0.36) 
-0.010 
(0.19) 
Delist RLBO+5 -0.682a 
(0.00) 
-0.481a 
(0.00) 
-0.610a 
(0.00) 
TermPremium RLBO+0 -1.420 
(0.69) 
0.386 
(0.90) 
-1.421 
(-0.69) 
F-Statistic  3.22a 3.15a 3.40a 
Adjusted R2  0.099 0.085 0.122 
Year Dummies  No No No 
Number of observations  148 164 139 
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Table 11 (continued) 
 
Panel B: OLS regression of post-RLBO industry-adjusted 36 month buy-and-hold returns 
Explanatory 
Variable Time Period Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept  0.229 
(0.35) 
0.088 
(0.70) 
0.197 
(0.47) 
Leverage RLBO+0 0.676c 
(0.07) 
0.855b 
(0.02) 
0.023 
(0.74) 
PPETA RLBO+0 -0.519 
(0.35) 
-0.135 
(0.81) 
0.814b 
(0.03) 
Growth LBO to RLBO 0.002a 
(0.01) 
  
∆R&D/Sales LBO to RLBO  -0.952 
(0.64) 
 
∆Capex/Sales LBO to RLBO   0.734b 
(0.03) 
∆Shares/Owner LBO to RLBO   -0.000 
(0.64) 
∆SG&A/Sales LBO to RLBO 0.322 
(0.49) 
  
∆ROA LBO to RLBO  1.783b 
(0.02) 
2.471b 
(0.02) 
RLBOYears LBO to RLBO -0.018 
(0.19) 
-0.016 
(0.25) 
-0.022 
(0.15) 
Delist RLBO+5 -1.223a 
(0.00) 
-1.117a 
(0.00) 
-1.222a 
(0.00) 
TermPremium RLBO+0 10.243 
(0.12) 
13.673b 
(0.03) 
12.833c 
(0.07) 
F-Statistic  3.07a 4.52a 4.18a 
Adjusted R2  0.090 0.131 0.156 
Year Dummies  No No No 
Number of observations  148 164 139 
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Table 12 
Firm Fundamentals at the RLBO and Long-run Stock Returns 
 
This table summarizes regressions of firm fundamentals at the RLBO and long-run stock returns. The sample 
consists of RLBOs between 1986 and 2006. Panel A reports 12 month returns, while Panel B presents 36 month 
returns. All variables are defined in Appendix A. P-values are reported in parenthesis.  a, b, and c denotes statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. All variables are industry-adjusted by 2-digit SIC code 
medians. 
Panel A: 12 month buy-and-hold returns 
Explanatory Variables Time Period Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept  0.088 
(0.54) 
0.234c 
(0.06) 
0.155 
(0.11) 
Log(Assets) RLBO+0 0.060b 
(0.03) 
 0.036 
(0.21) 
Leverage RLBO+0   0.169 
(0.24) 
PPETA RLBO+0 -0.280 
(0.14) 
-0.454b 
(0.05) 
 
COGSSls RLBO+0  -0.925b 
(0.02) 
 
Growth LBO to RLBO  0.001b 
(0.04) 
 
R&D/Sales RLBO+0   1.854b
(0.05) 
Capex/Sales RLBO+0   -0.383b 
(0.04) 
SG&A/Sales RLBO+0  -1.067a 
(0.00) 
 
Sales/Employee RLBO+0   0.000b 
(0.05) 
ExecComm RLBO+0 -0.194a 
(0.01) 
  
DualClass RLBO+0 -0.143 
(0.11) 
  
TotComm RLBO+0 0.043 
(0.32) 
  
Inside RLBO+0  -0.147 
(0.31) 
 
Block RLBO+0   -0.298 
(0.20) 
RLBOYears RLBO+0  -0.005 
(0.41) 
-0.005 
(0.41) 
Delist RLBO+0 -0.566a 
(0.00) 
-0.470a 
(0.00) 
-0.525a 
(0.00) 
TermPremium RLBO+0 0.190 
(0.95) 
-1.408 
(0.64) 
0.952 
(0.75) 
F-Statistic  3.41a 2.75a 2.85a 
Adjusted R2  0.077 0.082 0.079 
Year Dummies  No No No 
Num. of Observations  203 158 196 
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Table 12 (Continued) 
 
Panel A (Continued) 
Explanatory Variables Time Period Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept  0.127 
(0.23) 
0.082 
(0.40) 
Log(Assets) RLBO+0 0.029 
(0.30) 
0.066b 
(0.03) 
Leverage RLBO+0 0.103 
(0.45) 
0.077 
(0.61) 
R&D/Sales RLBO+0 1.998b 
(0.04) 
 
Shares/Owner RLBO+0 -0.000c 
(0.07) 
 
Div/TA RLBO+0 2.397b 
(0.05) 
 
Sales/Employee RLBO+0 0.000b 
(0.05) 
 
Cash/TA RLBO+0  0.323 
(0.49) 
MktBook RLBO+0  0.125a 
(0.01) 
RLBOYears RLBO+0 -0.006 
(0.38) 
-0.007 
(0.25) 
Delist RLBO+0 -0.532a 
(0.00) 
-0.461a 
(0.00) 
TermPremium RLBO+0 1.999 
(0.53) 
0.101 
(0.97) 
F-Statistic  3.22a 5.06a 
Adjusted R2  0.097 0.127 
Year Dummies  No No 
Num. of Observations  187 196 
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Table 12 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: 36 month buy-and-hold returns 
Explanatory Variables Time Period Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept  0.178 
(0.35) 
0.213 
(0.28) 
0.171 
(0.40) 
Log(Assets) RLBO+0 0.037 
(0.50) 
0.025 
(0.64) 
0.074 
(0.25) 
Leverage RLBO+0 0.525c 
(0.10) 
0.475 
(0.17) 
0.487 
(0.20) 
Capex/Sales RLBO+0   -0.958a 
(0.01) 
Shares/Owner RLBO+0 -0.000a 
(0.01) 
-0.000a 
(0.00) 
 
Div/TA RLBO+0 4.913c 
(0.07) 
4.483c 
(0.06) 
 
ROA RLBO+0  2.026b 
(0.04) 
 
Cash/TA RLBO+0   -0.479 
(0.61) 
MktBook RLBO+0   0.145 
(0.18) 
RLBOYears RLBO+0 -0.018 
(0.10) 
-0.026b 
(0.04) 
-0.021 
(0.12) 
Delist RLBO+0 -1.187a 
(0.00) 
-1.114a 
(0.00) 
-1.109a 
(0.00) 
TermPremium RLBO+0 13.350b 
(0.03) 
12.123b 
(0.05) 
8.993 
(0.13) 
F-Statistic  5.06a 5.48a 3.83a 
Adjusted R2  0.132 0.162 0.127 
Year Dummies  No No No 
Num. of Observations  188 186 196 
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Table 13 
Changes in Firm Fundamentals and Stock Returns Following the RLBO 
 
This table summarizes regressions of firm fundamentals the first two years after the RLBO and long-run stock 
returns over months 25 to 48. The sample consists of RLBOs between 1986 and 2006. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A. P-values are reported in parenthesis.  a, b, and c denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively. All variables are industry-adjusted by 2-digit SIC code medians. 
Explanatory Variables Time Period Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept  0.165 
(0.21) 
0.251b 
(0.05) 
0.240c 
(0.10) 
0.267c 
(0.07) 
Log(Assets) RLBO+0   -0.019 
(0.54) 
-0.015 
(0.64) 
Leverage RLBO+0 0.378c 
(0.07) 
0.313 
(0.11) 
0.394b 
(0.03) 
0.399b 
(0.03) 
PPETA RLBO+0 0.432 
(0.16) 
0.575b 
(0.05) 
  
∆COGS/Sls RLBO to RLBO+2  -1.114a 
(0.01) 
  
Growth RLBO to RLBO+2  0.123b 
(0.03) 
  
∆Shares/Owner RLBO to RLBO+2 0.000c 
(0.07) 
   
∆Capex/Sales RLBO to RLBO+2   1.594b 
(0.04) 
 
∆SG&A/Sales RLBO to RLBO+2 -0.035 
(0.95) 
   
∆Sales/Employee RLBO to RLBO+2    -0.000 
(0.25) 
∆ROA RLBO to RLBO+2   0.997a 
(0.00) 
0.957a 
(0.01) 
RLBOYears LBO to RLBO -0.015c 
(0.09) 
-0.014c 
(0.09) 
-0.015c 
(0.06) 
-0.015c 
(0.08) 
Delist RLBO+5 -0.861a 
(0.00) 
-0.713a 
(0.00) 
-0.671a 
(0.00) 
-0.706a 
(0.00) 
TermPremium RLBO+0 3.908 
(0.35) 
-0.302 
(0.94) 
1.327 
(0.74) 
0.202 
(0.96) 
F-Statistic  4.49a 6.24a 5.59a 4.54a 
Adjusted R2  0.151 0.183 0.166 0.138 
Year Dummies  No No No No 
Num. of Observations  138 165 162 156 
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Table 14 
Underwriter Ranking Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table summarizes descriptive statistics for variables employed in Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) underwriter 
ranking regressions. Beta and the standard deviation of returns (RetStdDev) are estimated from a daily time series of 
raw returns using the offer date +6 through offer date +260. Size is the gross proceeds from the offering. Size is 
standardized in dollars of the year 2000 using the annual inflation rate (CPI). Age is the age of the issuing firm at the 
time of the offer. UWRank is the Carter and Manaster (1990) underwriter rankings as updated by Carter, Dark, and 
Singh (1998). 
 
 Panel A: Mean, standard deviation, and median 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Median 
Beta 0.958 0.558 0.891 
StdDevRet 0.0310 0.012 0.029 
Size($ millions) 189.209 362.822 87.460 
Inflation Adjusted Size ($ millions) 199.515 375.566 100.084 
Age (years) 44.951 32.195 39.500 
Second (%) 13.20 24.59 0.00 
UWRank 8.600 0.835 9.001 
 
Panel B: Firm counts by underwriter ranking 
Underwriter Ranking Count Percent Cumulative Percent 
3.001 1 0.49 0.49 
5.001 1 0.49 0.98 
5.167 1 0.49 1.47 
6.001 5 2.45 3.92 
7.001 6 2.94 6.86 
8.001 38 18.63 25.49 
8.750 5 2.45 27.94 
8.833 4 1.96 29.90 
8.875 8 3.92 33.82 
9.000 15 7.35 41.18 
9.001 120 58.82 100.00 
Total 204 100.00  
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Table 15 
Long-run Stock Returns by Underwriter Ranking 
 
This table summarizes long-run stock returns by underwriter ranking. Abnormal returns are adjusted by IPOs, 
seasoned firms, industry medians, and control firms. IPO returns are based 1-digit SIC codes, while other 
adjustments employ 2-digit SIC codes. Control firms are selected based on size and industry, where 2-digit SIC 
codes are first used to determine industry, with remaining control firms based on 1-digit SIC codes. Underwriter 
rankings are based on the updated Carter and Manaster methodology. Rankings are on a scale of 0 to 9. A ranking is 
classified as low if it is less than 9. Rankings of 9 or higher are considered to be high. Buy-and-hold returns are 
winsorized at the 3rd standard deviation. All variables are defined in Appendix A. P-values are in parenthesis. a, b, 
and c denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Curly braces in Panel C represent 
compounded monthly intercepts over the sample time period. 
 
Panel A: Cumulative 12, 36, and 60 month buy-and-hold returns 
 12 Month Returns 36 Month Returns 60 Month Returns 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Raw Returns       
Low Ranking 0.028 
(0.64) 
0.050
(0.89) 
0.158
(0.21) 
-0.093
(0.84) 
0.421c 
(0.06) 
-0.224 
(0.60) 
High Ranking 0.221a 
(0.00) 
0.141a
(0.00) 
0.600a
(0.00) 
0.317a
(0.00) 
0.755a 
(0.00) 
0.273a 
(0.00) 
Low - High -0.193a 
(0.01) 
-0.091a 
(0.01) 
-0.442a 
(0.00) 
-0.410a 
(0.01) 
-0.335c 
(0.10) 
-0.497a 
(0.00) 
VW Index Adjusted       
Low Ranking -0.092 
(0.13) 
-0.108c
(0.10) 
-0.218c
(0.07) 
-0.424b
(0.01) 
-0.361c 
(0.08) 
-0.670a
(0.00) 
High Ranking 0.107b 
(0.02) 
0.044 
(0.12) 
0.249b 
(0.01) 
0.008 
(0.24) 
0.120 
(0.43) 
-0.087 
(0.33) 
Low - High -0.199a 
(0.01) 
-0.152a 
(0.01) 
-0.466a 
(0.00) 
-0.432a 
(0.00) 
-0.481b 
(0.03) 
-0.573a 
(0.00) 
IPO Firm Adjusted       
Low Ranking 0.113c 
(0.05) 
0.028 
(0.16) 
0.332a
(0.01) 
0.119 
(0.12) 
0.650a 
(0.00) 
0.091c
(0.10) 
High Ranking 0.275a 
(0.00) 
0.214a 
(0.00) 
0.735a 
(0.00) 
0.531a 
(0.00) 
0.976a 
(0.00) 
0.522a 
(0.00) 
Low - High -0.162b 
(0.01) 
-0.186b 
(0.01) 
-0.403a 
(0.01) 
-0.412a 
(0.00) 
-0.326c 
(0.10) 
-0.431a 
(0.00) 
Seasoned Firm Adjusted       
Low Ranking 0.049 
(0.43) 
0.044 
(0.69) 
0.241c 
(0.05) 
0.052 
(0.54) 
0.495b 
(0.02) 
-0.035 
(0.74) 
High Ranking 0.218a 
(0.00) 
0.130a 
(0.00) 
0.591a 
(0.00) 
0.291a 
(0.00) 
0.810a 
(0.00) 
0.303a 
(0.00) 
Low - High -0.169b 
(0.01) 
-0.086b 
(0.02) 
-0.351b 
(0.01) 
-0.238a 
(0.00) 
-0.315 
(0.11) 
-0.339a 
(0.00) 
Industry-Adjusted       
Low Ranking 0.057 
(0.36) 
0.45 
(0.59) 
0.254b 
(0.04) 
0.050 
(0.41) 
0.514b 
(0.02) 
-0.041 
(0.57) 
High Ranking 0.217a 
(0.00) 
0.154a 
(0.00) 
0.604a 
(0.00) 
0.327a 
(0.00) 
0.828a 
(0.00) 
0.335a 
(0.00) 
Low - High -0.160b 
(0.02) 
-0.109b 
(0.02) 
-0.350b 
(0.01) 
-0.277a 
(0.00) 
-0.314 
(0.11) 
-0.376a 
(0.00) 
Control Firm Adjusted       
Low Ranking -0.116 
(0.21) 
-0.046 
(0.27) 
-0.368c 
(0.08) 
-0.324c 
(0.06) 
-0.995 
(0.11) 
-0.324b 
(0.01) 
High Ranking 0.046 
(0.46) 
0.008 
(0.52) 
0.250c 
(0.08) 
0.157 
(0.15) 
-0.034 
(0.92) 
0.044 
(0.83) 
Low - High -0.162c 
(0.07) 
-0.054c 
(0.10) 
-0.618a 
(0.01) 
-0.481b 
(0.01) 
-0.961c 
(0.10) 
-0.368b 
(0.02) 
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Table 15 (continued) 
 
Panel B: OLS regression of 36 month buy-and hold returns 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Model 1 
(Raw) 
Model 2 
(VW Adj) 
Model 3 
(IPO Adj) 
Model 4 
(Seas Adj) 
Model 5 
(Ind Adj) 
Model 6 
(Ctl Firm) 
Intercept 1.535b 
(0.01) 
2.372a 
(0.00) 
1.073a 
(0.00) 
1.253a 
(0.00) 
1.221a 
(0.00) 
1.377a 
(0.00) 
High Rank Dummy 
(Rank >= 9) 
0.326b 
(0.02) 
0.034b
(0.03) 
0.124b
(0.03) 
0.113b
(0.05) 
0.114b 
(0.05) 
0.211b
(0.03) 
Log(Size) -0.084 
(0.21) 
0.001 
(0.95) 
-0.007
(0.79) 
-0.026 
(0.39) 
-0.024 
(0.42) 
0.001 
(0.98) 
Log(Age) -0.113 
(0.25) 
-0.014 
(0.14) 
-0.019 
(0.56) 
-0.039
(0.25) 
-0.035 
(0.31) 
0.074 
(0.16) 
SecondPct -0.050 
(0.82) 
-0.007 
(0.84) 
-0.057 
(0.62) 
-0.066 
(0.59) 
-0.071 
(0.57) 
-0.005 
(0.97) 
RetStdDev -31.091a 
(0.00) 
-1.331b 
(0.03) 
-5.452b 
(0.02) 
-7.711a 
(0.00) 
-7.283a 
(0.00) 
-2.578 
(0.26) 
F-Statistic 12.670a 2.650b 2.580b 2.840b 2.720b 1.940c 
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.039 0.038 0.044 0.041 0.023 
Sample Size 204 204 204 204 204 204 
 
 
Panel C: Intercepts from four factor model regressions 
Raw Returns 12 Month 36 Month 60 Month 
Low Ranking -0.008 
(0.41) 
{-0.087} 
-0.018b 
(0.01) 
{-0.471} 
-0.011c 
(0.06) 
{-0.484} 
High Ranking 0.008 
(0.21) 
{0.098} 
0.006c 
(0.07) 
{0.232} 
0.002 
(0.42) 
{0.159} 
Low - High -0.015c 
(0.06) 
{-0.169} 
-0.023a 
(0.00) 
{-0.573} 
-0.013b 
(0.03) 
{-0.556} 
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APPENDIX D: FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 
Median Industry-Adjusted Free Cash Flow / Sales 
Pre-LBO and Post-RLBO 
 
This figure plots the median ratio of capital expenditures to total assets (FCF/Sales) from five 
years before the LBO to five years after the RLBO. FCF/Sales is industry-adjusted by the 2-digit 
SIC code median value. The graph on the left describes years prior to the LBO.  The right graph 
plots years since the RLBO. The private period encompasses the years from LBO-0 through 
RLBO+0. All variables are defined in Appendix A.   
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Figure 2 
Median Industry-Adjusted Long-term Debt to Total Assets 
Pre-LBO and Post-RLBO 
 
This figure plots the median ratio of long-term debt to total assets (Leverage) from five years 
before the LBO to five years after the RLBO. Leverage is industry-adjusted by the 2-digit SIC 
code median value. The graph on the left describes years prior to the LBO.  The right graph plots 
years since the RLBO. The private period encompasses the years from LBO-0 through RLBO+0. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A.   
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Figure 3 
Median Industry-Adjusted Sales / Employee 
Pre-LBO and Post-RLBO 
 
This figure plots the median ratio of sales per employee (Sales/Employee) from five years before 
the LBO to five years after the RLBO.  Sales/Employee is industry-adjusted by the 2-digit SIC 
code median value. The graph on the left describes years prior to the LBO.  The right graph plots 
years since the RLBO. The private period encompasses the years from LBO-0 through RLBO+0. 
All variables are defined in Appendix A.   
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Figure 4 
Median Industry-Adjusted Capital Expenditures / Sales 
Pre-LBO and Post-RLBO 
 
This figure plots the median ratio of capital expenditures to total assets (Capex/Sales) from five 
years before the LBO to five years after the RLBO. Capex/Sales is industry-adjusted by the 2-
digit SIC code median value. The graph on the left describes years prior to the LBO.  The right 
graph plots years since the RLBO. The private period encompasses the years from LBO-0 
through RLBO+0. All variables are defined in Appendix A.   
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Figure 5 
Median Buy-and-Hold Returns 
 
This figure plots the median buy-and-hold returns at 12, 36, and 60 month intervals. Buy-and-
Hold returns are winsorized at the 3rd standard deviation following the procedures of Cowan and 
Sargeant (2001). Returns are plotted for RLBO, IPO, seasoned, and control firms.. RLBO 
indicates returns for sample RLBO firms. IPO represents IPO firm median returns by 1-digit SIC 
code. Seas designates medians of seasoned firms within industry based on 2-digit SIC codes. 
Cntrl indicates returns of matching control firms selected based on size (book value of assets) 
and industry (based on 2-digit SIC codes). All variables are defined in Appendix A.   
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Figure 6 
Median Buy-and-Hold Returns by Underwriter Ranking 
 
This figure plots the median buy-and-hold returns at 12, 36, and 60 month intervals. Buy-and-
Hold returns are winsorized at the 3rd standard deviation following the procedures of Cowan and 
Sargeant (2001). Returns are plotted for underwriters ranked as Low or High. Rankings are based 
on the methodology of Carter and Manaster (1990).  Low indicates a ranking less than 9.00. 
Rankings classified as High are 9.00 or greater. All variables are defined in Appendix A.   
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This dissertation is the first study to investigate public-to-private reverse leveraged 
buyouts (RLBOs). The first essay measures changes in profitability, financial structure, 
operations, and cost structure to detect actions taken during the private period. Results show that 
approaching the leveraged buyout there is an above industry level of free cash flow and capital 
expenditures, while growth options are at competitive levels. These factors in the presence of 
low ownership concentration suggest the existence of overinvestment.  
Increased leverage in the private period leads to significant declines in free cash flow and 
capital expenditures, while ownership concentration increases, which I contend incentivizes 
management to avoid overinvestment. I find that private period restructuring that improves 
growth and reduces cost structure leads to superior post-RLBO valuations. Further, even though 
free cash flow increases as leverage decreases, management retains the discipline to invest in 
projects that generate positive future cash flows. 
The second essay investigates long-run stock returns of public-to-private RLBOs. First, I 
examine whether RLBOs suffer from the same long-run underperformance characteristic of 
IPOs. Then, following up on the results in Chapter 2 that identifies the determinants of post-
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RLBO valuation, I investigate what firm characteristics are related to stock returns after the 
offering. Finally, I investigate whether underwriters perform the certification role found for first 
IPOs. 
The findings demonstrate that public-to-private RLBOs earns stock returns that 
outperform IPOs in comparable industries, with little evidence of market mispricing. As these 
RLBOs were previously exchange listed, I argue that reduced information asymmetry 
ameliorates the underperformance found for IPOs. The evidence suggests that restructuring that 
creates growth has the same beneficial impact on stock performance as for valuation. I also find 
that private period actions that reduce cost structure lead to positive stock returns after the 
RLBO. 
I find that executive committees of the board of directors are discounted by the market, 
leading to lower stock returns. Further, underwriter quality of RLBOs is generally higher than 
that of IPOs, and is positively correlated with stock performance. Public offerings by higher 
quality underwriters earn positive abnormal stock returns over long horizons. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
119 
 
 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT 
MARK GRUSKIN 
Education:  Ph. D., Finance, Wayne State University, 2011. 
   M. B. A., Accounting, Penn State University, 1979. 
   B. S., Computer Science, Penn State University, 1976. 
 
Dissertation:  Essays on Reverse Leveraged Buyouts 
 
Research Interests: Reverse Leveraged Buyouts, Corporate Governance and Executive Power, 
All Equity Firms, Value-Relevance of Accounting Information 
 
Professional American Finance Association 
Associations: Finance Management Association 
 Eastern Finance Association 
 
Teaching Part-Time Lecturer, WSU, Detroit, Michigan, 2008-2011 
Experience: 
 Graduate Teaching Assistant, WSU, Detroit, Michigan, 2010-2011 
 
 Part-Time Lecturer, University of Michigan-Dearborn, Dearborn, 
 Michigan, 1988-2007 
 
Corporate Ford Motor Company, Dearborn, Michigan, 1979-2006 
Experience: 
 
Awards & Honors: 2007-2009 Thomas C. Rumble Graduate Fellowship Award 
 
 Golden Key International Society 
 
 Penn State University Mount Nittany Society 
 
 Beta Gamma Sigma Business Fraternity 
